"Arbeitsmarkttheorie." . . "Arbeitsmarkttheorie" . "Arbeitslosenversicherung Arbeitsmarkttheorie Agency-Theorie Moral Hazard Adverse Selektion." . . "Großbritannien" . . "Arbeitslosenversicherung" . . "Arbeitslosenversicherung." . "USA" . . "Bildungsinvestition" . . "Lebenszyklus" . . "Arbeitslosenversicherung / Theorie / Arbeitsangebot / Bildungsinvestition / Lebenszyklus / Moral Hazard / Schätzung / Deutschland / USA / Großbritannien." . . . . "Agency-Theorie." . . "Agency-Theorie" . "Schätzung" . . "Arbeitsangebot" . . "Moral Hazard" . . "Moral Hazard." . . "Optimal unemployment insurance" . . . "Optimal unemployment insurance"@en . . . . "Optimal Unemployment Insurance"@en . . . . . "Electronic books"@en . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . "HauptbeschreibungDesigning a good unemployment insurance scheme is a delicate matter. In a system with no or little insurance, households may be subject to a high income risk, whereas excessively generous unemployment insurance systems are known to lead to high unemployment rates and are costly both from a fiscal perspective and for society as a whole. Andreas Pollak investigates what an optimal unemployment insurance system would look like, i.e. a system that constitutes the best possible compromise between income security and incentives to work. Using theoretical economic models and complex."@en . . . . . . . . "Business." . . "Deutschland" . . "Adverse Selektion." . . "Adverse Selektion" . "Theorie" . .