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"This paper shows that top management structures in large US firms radically changed since the mid-1980s. While the number of managers reporting directly to the CEO doubled, the growth was driven primarily by functional managers rather than general managers. Using panel data on senior management positions, we explore the relationship between changes in executive team composition, firm diversification, and IT investments--which arguably alter returns to exploiting synergies through corporate-wide coordination by functional managers in headquarters. We find that the number of functional managers closer to the product ("product" functions i.e., marketing, R&D) increase as firms focus their businesses, while the number of functional managers farther from the product ("administrative" functions i.e., finance, law, HR) increase with IT investments. Finally, we show that general manager pay decreases as functional managers join the executive team suggesting a shift in activities from general to functional managers--a phenomenon we term "functional centralization.""
"Top management structures in large U.S. firms have changed significantly since the mid-1980s. While the size of the executive team--the group of managers reporting directly to the CEO--doubled during this period, this growth was driven primarily by an increase in functional managers rather than general managers, a phenomenon we term "functional centralization." Using panel data on senior management positions, we show that changes in the structure of the executive team are tightly linked to changes in firm diversification and IT investments. These relationships depend crucially on the function involved: those closer to the product ("product" functions, e.g., marketing, R&D) behave differently from functions further from the product ("administrative" functions, e.g., finance, law, HR). We argue that this distinction is driven by differences in the information-processing activities associated with each function and apply this insight to refine and extend existing theories of centralization. We also discuss the implications of our results for organizational forms beyond the executive team."
"This paper shows that top management structures in large US firms have changed significantly since the mid-1980s. While the size of the executive team - the group of managers reporting directly to the CEO - doubled during this period, this growth was driven primarily by an increase in functional managers rather than general managers. Using panel data on senior management positions, we explore the relationship between changes in the structure of the executive team, firm diversification, and IT investments-which arguably alter returns to exploiting synergies through corporate-wide coordination by functional managers in headquarters. We find that the number of functional managers closer to the product ("product" functions i.e., marketing, R&D) increases as firms become less diversified, while the number of functional managers farther from the product ("administrative" functions i.e., finance, law, HR) increases with IT investments. Finally, we show that general manager pay decreases as functional managers join the executive team suggesting a shift in activities from general to functional managers-a phenomenon we term "functional centralization.""
"Top management structures in large US firms have changed significantly since the mid-1980s. While the size of the executive team--the group of managers reporting directly to the CEO--doubled during this period, this growth was driven primarily by an increase in functional managers rather than general managers, a phenomenon we term "functional centralization." Using panel data on senior management positions, we show that changes in the structure of the executive team are tightly linked to changes in firm diversification and IT investments. These relationships depend crucially on the function involved: those closer to the product ("product" functions, e.g. marketing / R & D) behave differently from functions further from the product ("administrative" functions, e.g. finance / law / HR). We argue that this distinction is driven by differences in the information-processing activities associated with each function, and apply this insight to refine and extend existing theories of centralization. We also discuss the implications of our results for organizational forms beyond the executive team."@en
"This paper shows that top management structures in large US firms radically changed since the mid-1980s. While the number of managers reporting directly to the CEO doubled, the growth was driven primarily by functional managers rather than general managers. Using panel data on senior management positions, we explore the relationship between changes in executive team composition, firm diversification, and IT investments-which arguably alter returns to exploiting synergies through corporate-wide coordination by functional managers in headquarters. We find that the number of functional managers closer to the product ("product" functions i.e., marketing, R&D) increase as firms focus their businesses, while the number of functional managers farther from the product ("administrative" functions i.e., finance, law, HR) increase with IT investments. Finally, we show that general manager pay decreases as functional managers join the executive team suggesting a shift in activities from general to functional managers-a phenomenon we term "functional centralization.""
"This paper shows that top management structures in large US firms radically changed since the mid-1980s. While the number of managers reporting directly to the CEO doubled, the growth was driven primarily by functional managers rather than general managers. Using panel data on senior management positions, we explore the relationship between changes in executive team composition, firm diversification, and IT investments - which arguably alter returns to exploiting synergies through corporate-wide coordination by functional managers in headquarters. We find that the number of functional managers closer to the product ("product" functions i.e., marketing, R&D) increase as firms focus their businesses, while the number of functional managers farther from the product ("administrative" functions i.e., finance, law, HR) increase with IT investments. Finally, we show that general manager pay decreases as functional managers join the executive team suggesting a shift in activities from general to functional managers - a phenomenon we term "functional centralization." -- communication ; organizational design ; functions ; centralization ; M-form ; hierarchy ; top management team ; information technology ; activities ; diversification"

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"Who lives in the C-suite? : organizational structure and the division of labor in top management"
"Who Lives in the C-Suite? Organizational Structure and the Division of Labor in Top Management"
"Who lives in the c-suite? : organizational structure and the division of labor in top management"
"Who lives in the c-suite? : organizational structure and the division of labor in top management"@en
"Who lives in the C-Suite? organizational structure and the division of labor in top management"

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