"Economics, economic history and consumer affairs." . . "Steuererhebung" . . . . . . . . . . . . . . "Cross-border tax externalities : are budget deficits too small ?" . . . . "\"In a dynamic optimising model with costly tax collection, a tax cut by one nation creates positive externalities for the rest of the world if initial public debt stocks are positive. By reducing tax collection costs, current tax cuts boost the resources available for current private consumption, lowering the global interest rate. This pecuniary externality benefits other countries because it reduces the tax collection costs for foreign governments of current and future debt service. In the non-cooperative equilibrium, nationalistic governments do not allow for the effect of lower domestic taxes on debt service costs abroad. Taxes are too high and government budget deficits too low compared to the global cooperative equilibrium. Even in the cooperative equilibrium complete tax smoothing is not optimal: current taxes will be lower than future taxes\"--NBER website."@en . . . "Cross-border tax externalities are budget deficits too small?"@en . . . . . "Cross-Border Tax Externalities Are Budget Defecits Too Small?" . . . . . "Cross-Border Tax Externalities : Are Budget Deficits Too Small?" . . . . . "Cross-border tax externalities : are budget deficits too small?" . "Cross-border tax externalities : are budget deficits too small?"@en . "Cross-Border Tax Externalities Are Budget Deficits Too Small?"@en . "Cross-border tax externalities: are budget deficits too small?" . . . . . . "In a dynamic optimising model with costly tax collection, a tax cut by one nation creates positive externalities for the rest of the world if initial public debt stocks are positive. By reducing tax collection costs, current tax cuts boost the resources available for current private consumption, lowering the global interest rate. This pecuniary externality benefits other countries because it reduces the tax collection costs for foreign governments of current and future debt service. In the non-cooperative equilibrium, nationalistic governments do not allow for the effect of lower domestic taxes on debt service costs abroad. Taxes are too high and government budget deficits too low compared to the global cooperative equilibrium. Even in the cooperative equilibrium complete tax smoothing is not optimal: current taxes will be lower than future taxes." . . . . . . . . . . . . . "Cross-border tax externalities" . . "Economías externas." . . "Wohlfahrtsanalyse" . . "Banking and finance." . . "Impuesto Recaudación." . . "International" . . "Theorie" . . "Intertemporales Gleichgewicht" . . "Öffentliche Schulden" . . "Deficit presupuestario." . . . . "Steuererhebung / Wohlfahrtseffekt / International / Öffentliche Schulden / Intertemporales Gleichgewicht / Optimale Besteuerung / Theorie." . . "Zonder onderwerpscode: economie." . . "National Bureau of Economic Research" . . "Optimale Besteuerung" . .