"Given the increasing interdependence of both financial systems and attendant payment and settlement systems a vital question is what form should optimal policy take when there are two connected payment systems with separate regulators. In this paper I show that two central banks operating in a non-cooperative way will not have an incentive to achieve the optimal allocation of goods. I further show that this non-cooperative outcome will be supported by a zero intraday interest rate and constant fixed exchange rate. This is in contrast to recent research; which has shown that domestically a zero intraday interest rate will achieve a social optimum and that the central bank has an incentive to achieve it. -- Payment, clearing, and settlement systems ; Exchange rate regimes"
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This is a placeholder reference for a Topic entity, related to a WorldCat Entity. Over time, these references will be replaced with persistent URIs to VIAF, FAST, WorldCat, and other Linked Data resources.