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The failure of counterinsurgency : why hearts and minds are seldom won

This book examines the implications of counterinsurgency warfare for U.S. defense policy and makes the compelling argument that the United States' default position on counterinsurgency wars should be to avoid them.

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  • "This book examines the implications of counterinsurgency warfare for U.S. defense policy and makes the compelling argument that the United States' default position on counterinsurgency wars should be to avoid them."@en
  • "Unlike conventional wars between nation-states -- with both sides wearing uniforms and using heavy weapons, such as tanks, artillery, fixed-wing aircraft, and ships -- fighting non-uniformed guerrillas in an insurgency that blend back into the civilian population is often a much different and more difficult task. Agile guerrillas often use hit-and-run tactics against isolated or locally inferior counterinsurgency (COIN) units. Insurgents, unlike terrorists, do try to hold ground but will usually retreat or blend back into the civilian population when confronted by superior COIN forces. Also, forces fighting an insurgency often rely less on heavy weapons and mechanized forces and more on infantry and special forces on the ground and helicopters in the air. After the less-than-stellar outcomes of COIN wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, a debate broke out in the U.S. military about whether expensive, troop-heavy, time-intensive efforts to win over local populations by nation building is dead. Even the proponents of so-called COIN warfare admit that the costs and risks are high. Opponents maintain that an effective national strategy should minimize the blood and treasure expended to achieve policy aims and that a classic COIN approach, to attempt to win the "hearts and minds" of people in foreign countries, does not measure up. Even in the limited number of episodes in which COIN forces won both militarily and politically, no one factor seems to regularly explain their success. The most significant factor in the outcome of such brushfire wars may be mostly out of the control of COIN forces -- whether the guerrillas are able to claim the mantle of "national liberators," either against a corrupt or authoritarian government or a foreign occupier. If a foreign occupier is involved, it is almost impossible to prevent the guerrillas from acquiring this image. Even in the case of a local corrupt or authoritarian government, where no foreign occupier is involved, the societal grievances generating the rebellion usually give the insurgents a leg up on acquiring this popular nationalist appeal. Thus, given all of the advantages guerrillas have in COIN wars, which are explored in this volume, and considering the inconsistency of key factors leading to the rare combined military and political victories for COIN forces, great powers should stay out of guerrilla wars unless their vital interests absolutely require entry. Fortunately, for the United States, its vital interests are only rarely threatened by guerrilla wars abroad, and avoiding them is a very real and viable possibility."@en

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  • "Electronic books"@en

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  • "The failure of counterinsurgency : why hearts and minds are seldom won"@en
  • "The failure of counterinsurgency : why hearts and minds are seldom won"

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