"International economic relations." . . "Financial crises." . . "Bank of Canada." . . "Bank of Canada," . "Debts, Public." . . "Debtor and creditor." . . "Debts, External." . . "Debts, Public Government policy." . . "Recessions Government policy." . . "Debt relief." . . . . . . . . . . "Addresses approaches to sovereign debt crises and the role of private creditors in risk-sharing and resolution of sovereign debt crises."@en . . . . . . "Ressources Internet" . . . . . . . . "\"In recent decades, the common perception had been that sovereign debt crises were unlikely to occur in advanced economies. Events in the euro area over the past few years, however, have undermined this view. The sovereign debt restructuring in Greece and the events surrounding the IMF-EU support packages for Ireland, Portugal and Cyprus have exposed fault lines in the existing practices for sovereign debt crisis resolution - perhaps most importantly, an overreliance on official sector liquidity support. This paper argues that the current approach is suboptimal for five main reasons: (i) it increases the risk of moral hazard; (ii) it incentivises short-term lending, which can increase the risk of liquidity crises; (iii) it puts an inequitable amount of tax-payer resources at risk; (iv) substantial official sector holdings of an insolvent sovereign's debt can complicate negotiated debt write-downs; and, (v) it can delay necessary reforms thereby requiring larger policy adjustments to be implemented when action is eventually taken. In response to these deficiencies, this paper argues that, for reasons of equity and efficiency, private creditors should play a greater role in risk-sharing and helping to resolve sovereign debt crises.\"- -Summary." . . . . . "Publications officielles" . "Electronic books"@en . "This paper provides an evaluation of the current approach to sovereign debt crisis resolution, in particular the overreliance on offical sector liquidity support. The paper is organised as follows: section 2 reviews the current way in which sovereign debt crises are tackled, and sets out where we see the major fault lines. Sections 3 and 4 introduce two state-contingent bonds--sovereign contingent convertible (coco) bonds and gross domestic product (GDP) linked bonds--designed to improve crisis resolution and prevention. Section 5 presents the authors' arguments relating to international coordination.--Includes text from document." . . . . . . . . . . . . "Sovereign default and state-contingent debt"@en . "Sovereign default and state-contingent debt" . . . . "Financial crises Prevention International cooperation." . . "Banque du Canada." . . "International finance." . . "Bank of England." . . "Bank of England," .