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A measure of freedom

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  • "It is often said that one person or society is 'freer' than another, or that people have a right to equal freedom, or that freedom should be increased or even maximized. Such quantitative claims about freedom are of great importance to us, forming an essential part of our political discourse and theorizing. Yet their meaning has been surprisingly neglected by political philosophers until now.; Ian Carter provides the first systematic account of the nature and importance of our judgements about degrees of freedom. He begins with an analysis of the normative assumptions behind the claim that individuals are entitled to a measure of freedom, and then goes on to ask whether it is indeed conceptually possible to measure freedom. Adopting a coherentist approach, the author argues for a conception of freedom that not only reflects commonly held intuitions about who is freer than who but is; also compatible with a liberal or freedom-based theory of justice."
  • "Exploring the nature of judgements about degrees of freedom this book argues for a conception of freedom that not only reflects commonly held intuitions about who is freer than who but that is also compatible with a liberal theory of justice."
  • "When liberal political philosophers talk of equalizing, increasing or maximizing freedom (or liberty), they implicitly assume freedom to be a measurable attribute. Freedom is one of the currencies of a liberal theory of distributive justice, and is therefore assumed to be something that individuals can possess in varying degrees. Yet it is rarely clear what is meant by claims about degrees of freedom. To make sense of such claims, we need to clarify the concept of overall freedom and ask whether its measurement is theoretically possible. This concept is important because freedom has, for liberals, non-specific (or content-independent) value -- i.e. value that is independent of the value of being free to do specific things. Liberals prescribe not only that individuals have certain specific freedom-types but also that they have a measure of (overall) freedom. Attempts to make sense of the concept of overall freedom by weighting particular options in terms of their values are erroneous, as these do not account for freedomʹs non-specific value. On the other hand, a closer examination of the problems of the individuation of actions and of the various types of constraints on freedom shows overall freedom to be measurable in a way that reflects its non-specific value. To this end, actions need to be individuated in spatio-temporal terms and constraints on freedom need to be characterized in terms of the physical compossibility of actions. The comparative judgements about freedom implied by this analysis (with reference both to individuals and to groups) are more coherent with our intuitive judgements than might at first be expected. -- From http://www.oxfordscholarship.com/view/10.1093/0198294530.001.0001/acprof-9780198294535 (Oct. 23, 2012)."

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  • "Livre électronique (Descripteur de forme)"
  • "Electronic books"@en
  • "Electronic books"
  • "Llibres electrònics"
  • "Ressource Internet (Descripteur de forme)"

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  • "A Measure of Freedom"
  • "A Measure of freedom"
  • "A measure of freedom"
  • "A measure of freedom"@en

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