Linked Data Explorerhttp://worldcat.org/entity/work/id/2604236454
Fiscal rules and discretion in a world economy
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- ""Governments are present-biased toward spending. Fiscal rules are deficit limits that trade off commitment to not overspend and flexibility to react to shocks. The authors compare centralized rules - chosen jointly by all countries - to decentralized rules. If governments' present bias is small, centralized rules are tighter than decentralized rules: individual countries do not internalize the redistributive effect of interest rates. However, if the bias is large, centralized rules are slacker: countries do not internalize the disciplining effect of interest rates. Surplus limits and money burning enhance welfare, and inefficiencies arise if some countries adopt stricter rules than imposed centrally."--Abstract."
http://schema.org/name
- "Fiscal rules and discretion in a world economy"