Linked Data Explorerhttp://worldcat.org/entity/work/id/33653795
Central bank independence and disinflationary credibility : a missing link
Granting central banks independence from short-term political control is widely assumed to decrease inflation by increasing the credibility of commitments to price stability. This paper analyzes public- and private-sector behavior in a sample of seventeen OECD countries for evidence of variations in disinflationary credibility with monetary institutions.
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- http://id.loc.gov/authorities/subjects/sh2008123653
- http://id.worldcat.org/fast/972453
- http://id.loc.gov/authorities/subjects/sh85011647
- http://id.worldcat.org/fast/1025234
- http://experiment.worldcat.org/entity/work/data/33653795#Topic/economie
- http://experiment.worldcat.org/entity/work/data/33653795#Topic/zonder_onderwerpscode
- http://id.worldcat.org/fast/827041
- http://id.loc.gov/authorities/subjects/sh2008107910
- http://id.worldcat.org/fast/827036
http://schema.org/description
- "Granting central banks independence from short-term political control is widely assumed to decrease inflation by increasing the credibility of commitments to price stability. This paper analyzes public- and private-sector behavior in a sample of seventeen OECD countries for evidence of variations in disinflationary credibility with monetary institutions."@en
http://schema.org/name
- "Central bank independence and disinflationary credibility : a missing link"
- "Central bank independence and disinflationary credibility : a missing link"@en
- "Central bank independence and disinflationary credibility a missing link"@en
- "Central bank independence and disinflationary credibility : a missing link?"
- "Central bank independence and disinflationary credibility : a missing link?"@en