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Heads we win the cognitive side of counterinsurgency (COIN).

This paper documents an effort to specify requirements for stronger cognition -- comprehension, reasoning, and decision making -- in 21st-century counterinsurgency (COIN). Unlike information technology (e.g., sensors, chat rooms, displays), cognition is what occurs "between the ears" after receiving information. It is as crucial to COIN as physical capabilities, organizational structures, and territorial control. Greater attention to cognitive capabilities is dictated by the rise and persistence of a new class of insurgency that combines utopian aims, intense motivation, global connectivity and mobility, extreme violence, and constant adaptation. The foremost example of this is the Islamist-Sunni-Salafist jihad, which aims to overthrow what its adherents see as a corrupt nation-state order in the Muslim world, devised by the West to dominate Islam. Like classical insurgency, the jihad vies for the support of a contested population -- in this case, alienated Muslims in both Muslim-majority and Muslim-minority states. Jihad not only aids but also infects local insurgencies with anti-Western venom, religious extremism, and suicide terrorism, making them more vicious and intractable. As we know from Iraq, Afghanistan, and the Levant, such hybrid (global-local) insurgencies are complex, unstable, and harder to comprehend than purely national insurgencies. The U.S. response to this pattern of insurgency has stressed new bureaucratic layers that seem to have improved neither analysis nor decisionmaking; increased investment in military platforms, which are of marginal utility against a diffuse and elusive insurgency; and the use of force, which may validate the jihadist argument, producing more jihadis and inspiring new martyrs. Investment in cognitive capabilities should encompass personnel policy (recruitment, advancement, retention); training and education; research and analysis; command-and-control transformation; and other measures of potential and enduring value.

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  • "This paper documents an effort to specify requirements for stronger cognition -- comprehension, reasoning, and decision making -- in 21st-century counterinsurgency (COIN). Unlike information technology (e.g., sensors, chat rooms, displays), cognition is what occurs "between the ears" after receiving information. It is as crucial to COIN as physical capabilities, organizational structures, and territorial control. Greater attention to cognitive capabilities is dictated by the rise and persistence of a new class of insurgency that combines utopian aims, intense motivation, global connectivity and mobility, extreme violence, and constant adaptation. The foremost example of this is the Islamist-Sunni-Salafist jihad, which aims to overthrow what its adherents see as a corrupt nation-state order in the Muslim world, devised by the West to dominate Islam. Like classical insurgency, the jihad vies for the support of a contested population -- in this case, alienated Muslims in both Muslim-majority and Muslim-minority states. Jihad not only aids but also infects local insurgencies with anti-Western venom, religious extremism, and suicide terrorism, making them more vicious and intractable. As we know from Iraq, Afghanistan, and the Levant, such hybrid (global-local) insurgencies are complex, unstable, and harder to comprehend than purely national insurgencies. The U.S. response to this pattern of insurgency has stressed new bureaucratic layers that seem to have improved neither analysis nor decisionmaking; increased investment in military platforms, which are of marginal utility against a diffuse and elusive insurgency; and the use of force, which may validate the jihadist argument, producing more jihadis and inspiring new martyrs. Investment in cognitive capabilities should encompass personnel policy (recruitment, advancement, retention); training and education; research and analysis; command-and-control transformation; and other measures of potential and enduring value."@en
  • "Current U.S. counterinsurgency (COIN) strategy has relied heavily on the use of force against Islamist insurgents-a tactic that has increased their ranks. What is needed instead are stronger cognitive capabilities that will enable more effective COIN against an elusive, decentralized, and highly motivated insurgency-capabilities that will enable the United States to "fight smarter." Cognitive COIN goes beyond information technology and encompasses comprehension, reasoning, and decisionmaking, the components that are most effective against an enemy that is quick to adapt, transform, and regener."
  • "Current U.S. counterinsurgency (COIN) strategy has relied heavily on the use of force against Islamist insurgents-a tactic that has increased their ranks. What is needed instead are stronger cognitive capabilities that will enable more effective COIN against an elusive, decentralized, and highly motivated insurgency-capabilities that will enable the United States to "fight smarter." Cognitive COIN goes beyond information technology and encompasses comprehension, reasoning, and decisionmaking, the components that are most effective against an enemy that is quick to adapt, transform, and regener."@en
  • "Current U.S. counterinsurgency strategy is in need of stronger cognitive capabilities that will enable the United States to "fight smarter." These include comprehension, reasoning, and decisionmaking, the components that are most effective against an enemy that is quick to adapt, transform, and regenerate. This paper offers concrete ideas for gaining the cognitive advantage in anticipating and countering the new global insurgency."
  • "Current U.S. counterinsurgency (COIN) strategy has relied heavily on the use of force against Islamist insurgents-a tactic that has increased their ranks. What is needed instead are stronger cognitive capabilities that will enable more effective COIN against an elusive, decentralized, and highly motivated insurgency-capabilities that will enable the United States to "fight smarter." Cognitive COIN goes beyond information technology and encompasses comprehension, reasoning, and decisionmaking, the components that are most effective against an enemy that is quick to adapt, transform, and regenerate. Countering the challenges of a global insurgency demands the ability to understand it, shape popular attitudes about it, and act directly against it. The four cognitive abilities that are most important to COIN operations are anticipation, opportunism, decision speed, and learning in action, applied through rapid-adaptive decisionmaking. In 21st-century COIN, tight control and bureaucracy must yield to the power of networked intelligence, with each operative authorized to act, react, and adapt. With these notions as a backdrop, this paper offers concrete ideas for gaining the cognitive advantage in anticipating and countering the new global insurgency."@en

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  • "Electronic books."
  • "Electronic books."@en
  • "Livres électroniques."
  • "Electronic books"

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  • "Heads we win the cognitive side of counterinsurgency (COIN)."
  • "Heads we win the cognitive side of counterinsurgency (COIN)."@en
  • "Cognitive side of counterinsurgency"
  • "Heads We Win - The Cognitive Side of Counterinsurgency (COIN) RAND Counterinsurgency Study--Paper 1."
  • "Heads we win the cognitive side of counterinsurgency (COIN)"
  • "Cognitive side of counterinsurgency (COIN)"
  • "Cognitive side of counterinsurgency (COIN)"@en
  • "Heads we win : the cognitive side of counterinsurgency (COIN) /"
  • "Heads we win the cognitive side of counterinsurgency (COIN) /"
  • "Heads we win the cognitive side of counterinsurgency (COIN) /"@en
  • "Heads we win--the cognitive side of counterinsurgency (COIN) RAND counterinsurgency study--paper 1 /"@en