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The Bush Administration characterizes Iran as a "profound threat to U.S. national security interests," a perception generated primarily by Iran's nuclear program and its military assistance to armed groups in Iraq and Afghanistan, to the Palestinian group Hamas, and to Lebanese Hezbollah. The threat assessment of some other governments was lessened by the December 3, 2007 key judgements of a National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) that indicates that Iran is not driving to develop an actual nuclear weapon, but Administration officials say that this finding was not the main thrust of the NIE, which judged Iran to be continuing uranium enrichment.
According to the "National Security Strategy" document released on March 16, 2006, the United States "may face no greater challenge from a single country than Iran." That perception has intensified following the military confrontation between Iranian-armed and assisted Lebanese Hezbollah and Israel in July-August 2006. To date, the Bush Administration has pursued several avenues to attempt to contain the potential threat posed by Iran, including supporting a long-term policy of changing Iran's regime. However, the Administration focus on preventing an Iranian nuclear weapons breakthrough has brought diplomatic and economic strategies to the forefront of U.S. policy. As part of that effort, the Bush Administration announced May 31 it would negotiate with Iran in concert with U.S. allies if Iran suspends uranium enrichment; in past years the Bush Administration had only limited dialogue with Iran on specific regional issues. However, Iran's August 22, 2006, response to a U.S. and partner offer to curb Iran's program fell short of U.S. conditions and of the demands to the same effect contained in U.N. Security Council Resolution 1696 (July 31, 2006). If diplomacy and sanctions do not succeed, some advocate military action against Iran's nuclear infrastructure rather than acquiescence to a nuclear-armed Iran. Others in the Administration believe that only a change of Iran's regime would end the threat posed by Iran. Successive administrations have pointed to the threat posed by Iran's policy in the Near East region, particularly material support to groups that use violence to prevent or complicate Israeli-Arab peace. Such groups have long included Lebanese Hezbollah and the Palestinian groups Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad. U.S. officials also accuse Iran of attempting to exert influence in Iraq by providing arms and other material assistance to Shiite Islamist militias, some of which are participating in escalating sectarian violence against Sunnis there.
According to the "National Security Strategy" released on March 16, 2006, the United States "may face no greater challenge from a single country than Iran." That perception, generated first and foremost by Iran's developing nuclear program, intensified following the military confrontation between Iranian-armed and assisted Lebanese Hezbollah and Israel in July-August 2006. To date, the Bush Administration has pursued several avenues to attempt to contain the potential threat posed by Iran. However, the Administration's focus on preventing an Iranian nuclear weapons breakthrough has brought diplomatic strategy to the forefront of U.S. policy. As part of that effort, the Bush Administration announced May 31 it would negotiate with Iran in concert with U.S. allies if Iran suspends uranium enrichment; in past years the Bush Administration had only limited dialogue with Iran on specific regional issues. However, Iran did not comply with an August 31, 2006, deadline to cease uranium enrichment, contained in U.N. Security Council Resolution 1696 (July 31, 2006), dividing the United States and partner countries over whether to continue diplomacy with Iran and whether to move to impose international sanctions on it. If diplomacy and sanctions do not succeed, some advocate military action against Iran's nuclear infrastructure rather than acquiescence to a nuclear-armed Iran. Others in the Administration believe that only a change of Iran's regime would end the threat Iran poses. Successive administrations have pointed to the threat to the United States and its allies posed by Iran's policy in the Near East region, particularly material support to groups that use violence to prevent Israeli-Arab peace or undermine pro-U.S. governments. U.S. officials also accuse Iran of attempting to exert influence in Iraq by providing arms and other material assistance to Shiite Islamist militias, some of which are participating in escalating sectarian violence against Sunnis there.
President Obama has said his Administration shares the goals of previous Administrations to contain Iran's strategic capabilities and regional influence. The Obama Administration has not changed the Bush Administration's characterization of Iran as a "profound threat to U.S. national security interests," a perception generated not only by Iran's nuclear program but also by its military assistance to armed groups in Iraq and Afghanistan, to the Palestinian group Hamas, and to Lebanese Hezbollah. However, the Obama Administration has formulated approaches to achieve those goals that differ from those of its predecessor by expanding direct diplomatic engagement with Iran's government and by downplaying discussion of potential U.S. military action against Iranian nuclear facilities. With the nuclear issue unresolved, the domestic unrest in Iran that has burgeoned since alleged wide-scale fraud was committed in Iran's June 12, 2009, presidential election has presented the Administration with a potential choice of continuing the engagement or backing the opposition "Green movement." In December 2009, Administration statements shifted toward greater public support of the Green movement, but Administration officials appear to believe that the opposition's prospects are enhanced by a low U.S. public profile on the unrest. Congressional resolutions and legislation since mid-2009 show growing congressional attention to the plight of Iran's opposition and support for steps to enhance the opposition's prospects. Iran's neighbors continue to engage the regime in normal trade and diplomatic exchange, although it is widely believed that many regional leaders, particularly the Persian Gulf states, are hoping for a regime collapse.
According to an Administration national security strategy document released on March 16, 2006, the United States "may face no greater challenge from a single country than Iran." Over the past five years, the Bush Administration has pursued several avenues to attempt to contain or end what it views as the potential threat posed by Iran, including pursuing limited engagement directly or through allies. However, support for a policy of changing Iran's regime has apparently gained favor within the Administration as Iran has resisted permanent curbs on its nuclear program. In the nearer term, the Administration is intent on slowing or blunting Iran's nuclear program through concerted action by the United Nations Security Council. Because Iran continues to advance its nuclear program despite international criticism, some advocate military action against Iran's nuclear infrastructure. International concerns about nuclear issues and other strategic issues have been heightened by the accession of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, a hardliner, as president. Iran's nuclear program is not the only major U.S. concern on Iran. Successive administrations have pointed to the threat posed by Iran's policy in the Near East region, particularly material support to groups that use violence against the U.S.-led Middle East peace process, including Hizballah in Lebanon and the Palestinian groups Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad. Hamas is forming a new Palestinian government following its victory in the January 25, 2006, elections. U.S. officials also accuse Iran of attempting to exert its influence in Iraq by providing arms and other material assistance to armed factions, possibly including anti-U.S. Shiite Islamist factions. Iran's human rights practices and strict limits on democracy have been consistently criticized by official U.S. and U.N. reports, particularly for Iran's suppression of political dissidents and religious and ethnic minorities.
United States concerns and policy responses
The Bush Administration characterizes Iran as a "profound threat to U.S. national security interests," a perception generated primarily by Iran's nuclear program and its military assistance to armed groups in Iraq and Afghanistan, to the Palestinian group Hamas, and to Lebanese Hezbollah. The Bush Administration's approach has been to try to prevent a nuclear breakout by Iran by applying coordinated international economic pressure on Iran while also offering it potential cooperation should it comply with the international demands to suspend its enrichment of uranium. The incorporation of diplomacy and engagement into the overall U.S. strategy led the Administration to approve the participation of a high-level State Department official at multilateral nuclear talks with Iran on July 19, 2008, although that meeting, and subsequent discussions, have not resulted in Iran's acceptance of the international offer of incentives.
According to the "National Security Strategy" of March 16, 2006, the United States "may face no greater challenge from a single country than Iran." That perception, generated first by Iran's developing nuclear program, intensified following the military confrontation between Iranian-armed and assisted Lebanese Hezbollah and Israel in July-August 2006. To date, the Bush Administration has pursued several avenues to attempt to contain the potential threat posed by Iran, but the Administration's focus on preventing an Iranian nuclear weapons breakthrough -- as well as on stabilizing Iraq -- has brought diplomatic strategy to the forefront. The Bush Administration announced May 31, 2006, it would negotiate with Iran in concert with U.S. allies if Iran suspends uranium enrichment. However, Iran did not comply with an August 31, 2006, deadline to cease uranium enrichment, contained in U.N. Security Council Resolution 1696 (July 31, 2006). After almost 4 months of negotiations during which Russia and China argued that diplomacy with Iran would yield greater results than would sanctions, the Security Council imposed modest sanctions on trade with Iran's nuclear infrastructure and a freeze on the assets of related entities and personalities. Iran remains out of compliance, and the international community is discussing further sanctions against it. Other Iranian policies -- particularly its material support to groups that use violence to prevent Israeli-Arab peace or undermine pro-U.S. governments -- are attracting growing U.S. concern. U.S. officials accuse Iran of attempting to exert influence in Iraq and causing the deaths of U.S. troops by providing arms and other material assistance to Shiite Islamist militias participating in sectarian violence against Iraq's Sunnis. The Administration is pursuing a containment strategy to support its diplomacy on Iran, including a naval buildup in the Persian Gulf and efforts to persuade European governments to curb trade with Iran.
The Bush Administration has pursued several avenues to attempt to contain or end the potential threat posed by Iran, at times pursuing limited engagement directly or through allies, and at other times leaning toward pursuing efforts to change Iran's regime. A potential international crisis has loomed over Iran's nuclear program after a U.S.-supported effort by three European nations to limit Iran's nuclear program broke down in August 2005. International concerns on nuclear issues and other strategic issues have been heightened by the accession of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, a hardliner, as president of Iran. He consistently advocated a return to many of the original principles of the Islamic revolution as set down by the late Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini. Some advocate military action against Iran's nuclear infrastructure, but others believe that continued diplomacy, combined with offers of economic rewards or threats of punishment, is the only viable option. Still others believe that only an outright replacement of Iran's regime would diminish the threat posed by Iran to U.S. interests. U.S. sanctions currently in effect ban or strictly limit U.S. trade, aid, and investment in Iran and penalize foreign firms that invest in Iran's energy sector, but unilateral U.S. sanctions do not appear to have materially slowed Iran's WMD programs or shaken the regime's grip on power. Iran's nuclear program is not the only major U.S. concern on Iran. Successive administrations have pointed to the threat posed by Iran's policy in the Near East region, particularly material support to groups that use violence against the U.S.-led Middle East peace process, including Hizballah in Lebanon and the Palestinian groups Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad. In addition, U.S. officials accuse Iran of attempting to exert its influence in Iraq by providing arms and other material assistance to armed factions, possibly including anti-U.S. Shiite Islamist factions.
Iran: U.S. Concerns and Policy Responses
President Obama has said his Administration shares the goals of previous administrations to contain Iran's strategic capabilities and regional influence. The Obama Administration has not changed the Bush Administration's characterization of Iran as a "profound threat to U.S. national security interests," a perception generated not only by Iran's nuclear program but also by its military assistance to armed groups in Iraq and Afghanistan, to the Palestinian group Hamas, and to Lebanese Hezbollah. However, the Obama Administration has formulated approaches to achieve those goals that differ from those of its predecessor by expanding direct diplomatic engagement with Iran's government and by downplaying discussion of potential U.S. military action against Iranian nuclear facilities. With the nuclear issue unresolved, the domestic unrest in Iran that has occurred since alleged wide-scale fraud was committed in Iran's June 12, 2009, presidential election has presented the Administration with a potential choice of continuing the engagement or backing the opposition "Green movement." In December 2009, Administration statements shifted toward greater public support of the Green movement, but Administration officials appear to believe that the opposition's prospects are enhanced by a low U.S. public profile on the unrest. Congressional resolutions and legislation since mid-2009 show growing congressional support for steps to enhance the opposition's prospects. Yet, some experts saw the regime's successful effort to prevent the holding of a large Green movement protest on "revolution day," February 11, 2010, as an indication that the Administration should return to its engagement efforts.
According to the Administration's "National Security Strategy" document released on March 16, 2006, the United States "may face no greater challenge from a single country than Iran." That perception continues, generated primarily by Iran's developing nuclear program and intensified by Iran's military assistance to armed groups in Iraq and Afghanistan and to Lebanese Hezbollah. U.S. officials also accuse Iran of refusing to bring to justice several senior Al Qaeda activists in Iran. In part to direct regional attention to that view but also to engage Iran on an Iraq solution, the Administration attended regional conferences on Iraq on March 10, 2007, and May 3-4, 2007, both attended by Iran (and Syria), and subsequently held a bilateral meeting with Iran in Baghdad on May 28. The Bush Administration is pursuing several avenues to attempt to contain the potential threat posed by Iran, but the U.S. emphasis is now on multilateral sanctions and diplomatic pressure on Iran. Iran has not complied with repeated U.N. Security Council deadlines since August 2006 to cease uranium enrichment. That demand is encapsulated in two U.N. resolutions (1737 and 1747) to date that ban trade with and freeze the assets of Iran's nuclear and related entities and personalities, prevent Iran from transferring arms outside Iran, and require reporting on international travel by named Iranians. Separate U.S. efforts have included trying to persuade European governments to curb trade, investment, and credits to Iran; and pressuring foreign banks not to do business with Iran.
According to the Administration's National Security Strategy document released on March 16, 2006, the United States may face no greater challenge from a single country than Iran. That perception continues, generated primarily by Iran s nuclear program and intensified by Iran s military assistance to armed groups in Iraq and Afghanistan and to Lebanese Hezbollah. In part to direct regional attention to that view but also to engage Iran on an Iraq solution, the Administration attended regional conferences on Iraq on March 10, 2007, and May 3-4, 2007, both attended by Iran (and Syria), and subsequently has held a series of bilateral meetings with Iran in Baghdad. The Bush Administration is pursuing several approaches to attempt to contain the potential threat posed by Iran, but the U.S. emphasis now is to strengthen international economic sanctions on Iran to compel Iran to comply with the U.N. Security Council deadlines since August 2006 that have demanded it cease uranium enrichment. Two U.N. resolutions (1737 and 1747) ban weapons of mass destruction (WMD)-related trade with Iran, freeze the assets of Iran s nuclear and related entities and personalities, prevent Iran from transferring arms outside Iran, and require reporting on international travel by named Iranians. With Iran still refusing to comply on enrichment but offering to reveal to the International Atomic Energy Agency additional information on its nuclear program, further steps are under discussion at the U.N. Security Council, although some Security Council members want to await the results of additional diplomacy before extending sanctions to civilian trade issues. Separate U.S. efforts, showing some success, have included trying to persuade European governments to curb trade, investment, and credits to Iran; and pressuring foreign banks not to do business with Iran.
The Obama Administration has continued the long-standing characterization of Iran as a "profound threat to U.S. national security interests." This threat perception has been generated not only by Iran's nuclear program but also by its military assistance to armed groups in Iraq and Afghanistan, to the Palestinian group Hamas, and to Lebanese Hezbollah. In its first year, the Obama Administration altered the previous U.S. approach by expanding direct diplomatic engagement with Iran's government and by offering Iran's leaders an alternative vision of closer integration with and acceptance by the West. To try to convince Iranian leaders of peaceful U.S. intent, the Obama Administration downplayed discussion of potential U.S. military action against Iranian nuclear facilities and repeatedly insisted that it did not seek to change Iran's regime. It held to this position even at the height of the protests by the domestic opposition "Green movement" that emerged following Iran's June 12, 2009, presidential election.
According to the Administration's National Security Strategy document released on March 16, 2006, the United States may face no greater challenge from a single country than Iran. That perception, generated first and foremost by Iran s developing nuclear program, intensified following the military confrontation between Iranian-armed and assisted Lebanese Hezbollah and Israel in July-August 2006. To date, the Bush Administration has pursued several avenues to attempt to contain the potential threat posed by Iran. However, the Administration s focus on preventing an Iranian nuclear weapons breakthrough has brought diplomatic strategy to the forefront of U.S. policy. The Bush Administration announced May 31 it would negotiate with Iran in concert with U.S. allies if Iran suspends uranium enrichment. However, Iran did not comply with an August 31, 2006, deadline to cease uranium enrichment, contained in U.N. Security Council Resolution 1696 (July 31, 2006). After almost four months of negotiations during which Russia and, to a lesser extent, China, argued that diplomacy with Iran would yield greater results than would sanctions, the Security Council agreed to impose some modest sanctions on trade with Iran s nuclear infrastructure and a freeze on trade with and the assets of related entities and personalities. (Resolution 1737, passed unanimously on December 23, 2006).
The Bush Administration has pursued several avenues to attempt to contain or end the potential threat posed by Iran, at times pursuing limited engagement, and at other times leaning toward pursuing efforts to change Iran's regime. Some experts believe a potential crisis is looming over Iran's nuclear program because the Bush Administration is skeptical that efforts by several European allies to prevent a nuclear breakout by Iran will succeed, although the Administration announced steps in March 2005 to support those talks. U.S. concerns have been heightened by the victory of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, an admitted hardliner, in Iran's presidential election on June 24, 2005. Some advocate military action against Iran's nuclear infrastructure, but others believe that a combination of diplomatic and economic rewards and punishment are the only viable options on the nuclear issue. U.S. sanctions currently in effect ban or strictly limit U.S. trade, aid, and investment in Iran and penalize foreign firms that invest in Iran's energy sector, but unilateral U.S. sanctions do not appear to have materially slowed Iran's WMD programs to date. Other major U.S. concerns include Iran's material support to groups that use violence against the U.S.-led Middle East peace process, including Hizballah in Lebanon and the Palestinian groups Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad. Some senior Al Qaeda activists are in Iran as well, although Iran claims they are "in custody" and will be tried. Iran did not obstruct the U.S. effort to oust Iraq's Saddam Hussein, a long-time Tehran adversary, at least partly in the expectation that pro-Iranian Shiite Islamic factions would come to power in Iraq in the aftermath. That result occurred at the January 30, 2005 elections there. Iran's human rights practices and strict limits on democracy have been consistently criticized by official U.S. and U.N. reports, particularly for Iran's suppression of political dissidents and religious and ethnic minorities.
According to the Administration's "National Security Strategy" released on March 16, 2006, the United States "may face no greater challenge from a single country than Iran." That perception intensified following the military confrontation between Iranian-armed and assisted Lebanese Hezbollah and Israel in July-August 2006. To date, the Bush Administration has pursued several avenues to attempt to contain the potential threat posed by Iran. However, the Administration's focus on preventing an Iranian nuclear weapons breakthrough has brought diplomatic strategy to the forefront of U.S. policy. As part of that effort, the Bush Administration announced May 31 it would negotiate with Iran in concert with U.S. allies if Iran suspends uranium enrichment; in past years the Bush Administration had only limited dialog with Iran on specific regional issues. However, Iran did not comply with an August 31, 2006, deadline to cease uranium enrichment as per U.N. Security Council Resolution 1696 (July 31, 2006), dividing the United States and partner countries over whether to continue diplomacy with Iran and whether to move to impose international sanctions on it. If diplomacy and sanctions do not succeed, some advocate military action against Iran's nuclear infrastructure rather than acquiescence to a nuclear-armed Iran. Others in the Administration believe that only a change of Iran's regime would end the threat posed by Iran. Iran's nuclear program is not the only major U.S. concern with Iran. Successive administrations have pointed to the threat to the United States and its allies posed by Iran's policy in the Near East region, particularly material support to groups that use violence to prevent Israeli-Arab peace. Such groups have long included Lebanese Hezbollah and the Palestinian groups Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad. U.S. officials also accuse Iran of attempting to exert influence in Iraq by providing arms and other material assistance to Shiite Islamist militias.
According to the "National Security Strategy" released on March 16, 2006, the United States "may face no greater challenge from a single country than Iran." That perception, generated first and foremost by Iran's developing nuclear program, intensified following the military confrontation between Iranian-armed and assisted Lebanese Hezbollah and Israel in July-August 2006. To date, the Bush Administration has pursued several avenues to attempt to contain the potential threat posed by Iran, but the Administration's focus on preventing an Iranian nuclear weapons breakthrough has brought diplomatic strategy to the forefront. The Bush Administration announced May 31, 2006, it would negotiate with Iran in concert with U.S. allies if Iran suspends uranium enrichment. However, Iran did not comply with an August 31, 2006, deadline to cease uranium enrichment, contained in U.N. Security Council Resolution 1696 (July 31, 2006). After almost 4 months of negotiations during which Russia and China argued that diplomacy with Iran would yield greater results than would sanctions, the Security Council agreed to impose some modest sanctions on trade with Iran's nuclear infrastructure and a freeze on the assets of related entities and personalities. (Resolution 1737, passed unanimously on Dec 23, 2006). If diplomacy and sanctions do not succeed, some advocate military action against Iran's nuclear infrastructure rather than acquiescence to a nuclear-armed Iran. Others in the Administration believe that only a change of Iran's regime would end the threat Iran poses. Successive administrations have pointed to the threat to the United States and its allies posed by Iran's policy in the Near East region, particularly material support to groups that use violence to prevent Israeli-Arab peace or undermine pro-U.S. governments. U.S. officials also accuse Iran of attempting to exert influence in Iraq by providing arms and other material assistance to Shiite Islamist militias there.
According to the Administration's National Security Strategy document released on March 16, 2006, the United States may face no greater challenge from a single country than Iran. That perception, generated primarily by Iran s developing nuclear program, has been intensified by Iran s assistance to Shiite armed groups in Iraq and to Lebanese Hezbollah. U.S. officials also accuse Iran of refusing to bring to justice several senior Al Qaeda activists in Iran. U.S. officials further cite Iran for causing the deaths of U.S. troops by providing arms and other material assistance to Shiite Islamist militias participating in escalating sectarian violence against Iraq s Sunnis. In part to direct regional attention to that view but also to engage Iran on an Iraq solution, the Administration supported and attended regional conferences on Iraq on March 10, 2007, and May 3-4, 2007, both attended by Iran (and Syria). The Bush Administration is pursuing several avenues to attempt to contain the potential threat posed by Iran, but the U.S. focus is now on multilateral and to some extent bilateral diplomacy. Iran has not complied with repeated U.N. Security Council deadlines since August 2006 to cease uranium enrichment, resulting in two U.N. resolutions (1737 and 1747) to date that ban trade with and freeze the assets of Iran s nuclear and related entities and personalities, prevent Iran from transferring arms outside Iran, and require reporting on international travel by named Iranians.
According to the "National Security Strategy" of March 16, 2006, the United States "may face no greater challenge from a single country than Iran." That perception, generated first by Iran's developing nuclear program, has been intensified by Iran's assistance to Shiite armed groups in Iraq and to Lebanese Hezbollah. The Bush Administration is pursuing several avenues to attempt to contain the potential threat posed by Iran, but the Administration's focus on preventing an Iranian nuclear weapons breakthrough -- as well as on stabilizing Iraq -- has brought multilateral diplomatic strategy to the forefront. Iran did not comply with an August 31, 2006, deadline to cease uranium enrichment, contained in U.N. Security Council Resolution 1696 (July 31, 2006). After almost 4 months of negotiations during which Russia and China argued that diplomacy with Iran would yield greater results than would sanctions, the Security Council imposed modest sanctions on trade with Iran's nuclear infrastructure and a freeze on trade with and the assets of related entities and personalities. (Resolution 1737, passed unanimously on Dec 23, 2006). Iran remained out of compliance, and the international community increased sanctions in a follow-on Resolution (1747) adopted unanimously on March 24, 2007. The Administration's containment strategy includes a naval buildup in the Persian Gulf, efforts to persuade European governments to curb trade with Iran, and pressure on foreign banks not to do business with Iran. Some legislation introduced in the 110th Congress, including H.R. 1400, S. 970, and H.R. 957, would tighten some U.S. sanctions on Iran. Amid signs that the pressure is causing increased strains among leaders in Iran, the Administration strongly denies it is planning on military action against Iran. Some in the Administration believe that only a change of Iran's regime would end the threat posed by Iran, although without a clear means of achieving such a result.
The Bush Administration has generally continued the Iran policies of previous administrations by attempting to contain Iran while pursuing limited engagement with it. At times, the Administration has appeared to favor a strategy of regime change, although without taking concrete steps in that direction. During the previous Administration, signs of moderation in Iran had stimulated the United States to try to engage Iran in broad, official talks. Relations took a downturn after the September 11, 2001, attacks on the United States when the issue of international terrorism took center stage. President Bush singled out Iran, North Korea, and Iraq as part of an "axis of evil" in his January 29, 2002, State of the Union message. Since then, common interests in stability in post-conflict Afghanistan and post-Saddam Iraq have led to occasional direct contact. Iran's alleged efforts to acquire weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and delivery means, coupled with its support of terrorist groups, have long been key U.S. concerns. The Bush Administration and many in Congress are expressing strong suspicions of Iran's nuclear intentions; these concerns have been heightened by reported major strides in Iran's nuclear program and halting and incomplete cooperation with a strict program of International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspections and safeguards. Another U.S. concern has been Iran's active opposition to the U.S.-led Middle East peace process, including material support to Hizballah in Lebanon and such Palestinian groups as Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad. Iran was quietly helpful in the U.S. effort to oust Iraq's Saddam Hussein, a long-time Tehran adversary, although Iran reportedly is supporting Shiite Islamic factions there that do not espouse most Western values. Iran's human rights practices and limits on democracy are frequently criticized by U.S. officials and Members.
The Obama Administration has adopted the long-standing assessment of Iran as a "profound threat to U.S. national security interests." This threat perception is generated not only by Iran's nuclear program but also by its military assistance to armed groups in Iraq and Afghanistan, to the Palestinian group Hamas, and to Lebanese Hezbollah. In its first year, the Obama Administration altered the previous U.S. approach by expanding direct diplomatic engagement with Iran's government and by offering Iran's leaders an alternative vision of closer integration with and acceptance by the West. To try to convince Iranian leaders of peaceful U.S. intent, the Obama Administration downplayed discussion of potential U.S. military action against Iranian nuclear facilities and repeatedly insisted that it did not seek to change Iran's regime. It held to this position even at the height of the protests by the domestic opposition "Green movement" that emerged following Iran's June 12, 2009, presidential election. Iran's refusal to accept the details of an October 1, 2009, tentative agreement to lessen concerns about its nuclear intentions--coupled with its crackdown on the Green movement--caused the Administration, in 2010, to shift toward building multilateral support for strict economic sanctions against Iran. The Administration efforts bore fruit on June 9, 2009 when a U.N. Security Council was adopted (Resolution 1929) that required countries to take a number of significant steps against Iran, including banning major arms sales to Iran, and authorized a number of additional significant steps.
According to an Administration national security strategy document released on March 16, 2006, the United States "may face no greater challenge from a single country than Iran." Over the past five years, the Bush Administration has pursued several avenues to attempt to contain or end what it views as the potential threat posed by Iran, including pursuing limited engagement directly or through allies. However, support for a policy of changing Iran's regime has apparently gained favor within the Administration as Iran has resisted permanent curbs on its nuclear program. In the nearer term, the Administration is intent on slowing or blunting Iran's nuclear program through concerted action by the United Nations Security Council. Because Iran continues to advance its nuclear program despite international criticism, some advocate military action against Iran's nuclear infrastructure. International concerns on nuclear issues and other strategic issues have been heightened by the accession of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, a hardliner, as president. Iran's nuclear program is not the only major U.S. concern on Iran. Successive administrations have pointed to the threat posed by Iran's policy in the Near EAst region, particularly material support to groups that use violence against the U.S.-led Middle East peace process, including Hizballah in Lebanon and the Palestinian groups Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad. Hamas is forming a new Palestinian government following its victory in January 25, 2006, elections, a development that might cause Hamas to distance itself from terrorism. Alternately, Hamas might hold fast to its rejection of Israel and look to Iran or other hardline Middle Eastern states to circumvent any U.S. or Israeli efforts to pressure the new Hamas-led government. Some senior Al Qaeda activists are in Iran as well, although Iran claims they are "in custody." U.S. officials also accuse Iran of attempting to exert its influence in Iraq by providing arms and other material assistance to armed factions, possibly including anti-U.S. Shiite Islamic factions. However, most Iranian-supported factions in Iraq are supportive of the U.S.-led political transition road map, and the two announced in March 2006 that they would hold bilateral talks on the issue of stabilizing Iraq. Iran's human rights practices and strict limits on democracy have been consistently criticized by official U.S. and U.N. reports, particularly for Iran's suppression of political dissidents and religious and ethnic minorities. However, Iran hold elections or many senior positions, including that of president. U.S. officials generally see the human rights issue in Iran in broaderader context, and not necessarily as a direct threat, in and of itself, to U.S. interests in the region.
President Obama has said his Administration shares the goals of the previous Administration to contain Iran's strategic capabilities and regional influence, but the Obama Administration has formulated approaches to achieve those goals that differ from those of its predecessor in particular through expanded direct diplomatic engagement with Iran. This effort has begun to be put in practice with messages to the Iranian people by President Obama, and through a growing number of invitations to and contact with Iranian diplomats at multilateral meetings, including those on Iran's nuclear program. The Administration also has de-emphasized policies that have angered Iranian leaders including: ratcheting up international sanctions, efforts to promote democracy in Iran, and the potential for U.S. military action. In May 2009, President Obama said his Administration might renew the previous focus on sanctioning and pressuring Iran if, by the end of 2009, Iran does not show signs of willingness to compromise. Bills in the 111th Congress, such as H.R. 2194 and S. 908, would tighten U.S. sanctions on Iran by amending the Iran Sanctions Act to penalize sales to Iran of gasoline. Before Iran's June 12, 2009, presidential elections, there was debate over whether the new approaches would yield clear results. The U.S. strategy has been further complicated by the allegations of a "stolen election" by the challengers to declared election winner, incumbent President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, and the large protests held to demand a new vote. Administration officials say that U.S. goals have not been altered by the election and President Obama, while criticizing Iran's use of violence against protesters, has not announced any changes in policy toward Iran. Congress has passed resolutions that express solidarity with the demonstrators and condemn the regime's repression of them.
The Bush Administration has pursued several avenues to attempt to contain or end the potential threat posed by Iran, at times pursuing limited engagement, and at other times leaning toward pursuing efforts to change Iran's regime. Some experts believe a potential crisis is looming over Iran's nuclear program because the Bush Administration is skeptical that efforts by several European allies to prevent a nuclear breakout by Iran will succeed, although the Administration announced steps in March 2005 to support those talks. Some advocate military action against Iran's nuclear infrastructure, but others believe that a combination of diplomatic and economic rewards and punishment are the only viable options on the nuclear issue. U.S. sanctions currently in effect ban or strictly limit U.S. trade, aid, and investment in Iran and penalize foreign firms that invest in Iran's energy sector, but unilateral U.S. sanctions do not appear to have materially slowed Iran's Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) programs to date. Other major U.S. concerns include Iran's material support to groups that use violence against the U.S.-led Middle East peace process, including Hizballah in Lebanon and the Palestinian groups Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad. Some senior Al Qaeda activists are in Iran as well, although Iran claims they are "in custody" and will be tried. Iran did not obstruct the U.S. effort to oust Iraq's Saddam Hussein, a long-time Tehran adversary, at least partly in the expectation that pro-Iranian Shiite Islamic factions would come to power in Iraq in the aftermath. That result occurred as a product of January 30, 2005 elections there. Iran is also assisting pro-Iranian local leaders in Afghanistan. Iran's human rights practices and strict limits on democracy have been consistently criticized by official U.S. and U.N. reports, particularly for Iran's suppression of political dissidents and religious and ethnic minorities.
Iran U.S. concerns and policy
The Bush Administration has pursued several avenues to attempt to contain the potential strategic threat posed by Iran, at times pursuing limited engagement with Iran and at other times leaning toward attempting to change its regime. However, some experts believe a potential crisis is looming over Iran's nuclear program because the Bush Administration is skeptical that efforts by several European allies to prevent a nuclear breakout by Iran will succeed. U.S. sanctions currently in effect ban or strictly limit U.S. trade, aid, and investment in Iran and penalize foreign firms that invest in Iran's energy sector, but unilateral U.S. sanctions do not appear to have significantly slowed Iran's Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) programs to date. Some advocate military action against Iran's nuclear infrastructure, but others believe that a combination of diplomatic and economic rewards and punishment are the only viable options on the nuclear issue. Other major U.S. concerns include Iran's policy in the Near East region, particularly Iran's material support to groups that use violence against the U.S.-led Middle East peace process, including Hizballah in Lebanon and the Palestinian groups Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad. Some senior Al Qaeda activists are in Iran as well, although Iran claims they are "in custody" and will be tried, and the 9/11 Commission has found that some officials in Iran might have facilitated or at least tolerated travel through Iran by Al Qaeda operatives. Iran was quietly helpful in the U.S. effort to oust Iraq's Saddam Hussein, a long-time Tehran adversary, although Iran reportedly is supporting some armed Shiite Islamic factions there. Iran also is reported to be assisting pro-Iranian local leaders in Afghanistan. Iran's human rights practices and strict limits on democracy have been consistently and harshly criticized by official U.S. reports, particularly for Iran's suppression of religious and ethnic minorities.
The Bush Administration has pursued several avenues to attempt to contain or end the potential threat posed by Iran, including pursuing limited engagement directly or through allies. Over the past two years, the Administration has focused primarily on blunting Iran's nuclear program by backing diplomatic efforts by European nations and Russia to negotiate permanent curbs on it. International concerns on nuclear issues and other strategic issues have been heightened by the accession of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, a hardliner, as president. With Iran continuing to advance its nuclear program, some advocate military action against Iran's nuclear infrastructure, but others believe that continued diplomacy, combined with offers of economic rewards or threats of international sanctions, is the only viable option. U.S. sanctions currently in effect ban or strictly limit U.S. trade, aid, and investment in Iran and penalize foreign firms that invest in Iran's energy sector, but unilateral U.S. sanctions have not ended Iran's WMD programs or shaken the regime's grip on power. Still others believe that only an outright replacement of Iran's regime would diminish the threat posed by Than to U.S. interests, and this view has apparently gained favor within the Administration as Than has resisted permanent curbs on its nuclear program.
According to the Administration s National Security Strategy document released on March 16, 2006, the United States may face no greater challenge from a single country than Iran. That perception continues, generated primarily by Iran s nuclear program and intensified by Iran's military assistance to armed groups in Iraq and Afghanistan and to Lebanese Hezbollah. U.S. officials also accuse Iran of refusing to bring to justice several senior Al Qaeda activists in Iran. In part to direct regional attention to that view but also to engage Iran on an Iraq solution, the Administration attended regional conferences on Iraq on March 10, 2007, and May 3-4, 2007, both attended by Iran (and Syria), and subsequently held bilateral meetings with Iran in Baghdad on May 28 and July 24, agreeing in the latter meeting to form a working group on Iraq security issues, which met for the first time on August 6.
Iran U.S. concerns and policy responses
According to the Administration, Iran is a major national security challenge for the United States. The Administration perception is generated primarily by Iran s nuclear program but is compounded by Iran's military assistance to armed groups in Iraq and Afghanistan and to the Palestinian group Hamas and Lebanese Hezbollah. However, the threat assessment of some other governments was lessened by the December 3, 2007 key judgements of a National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) that indicates that Iran is likely not on a drive to develop an actual nuclear weapon.
According to the Administration's "National Security Strategy" document released on March 16, 2006, the United States "may face no greater challenge from a single country than Iran." That perception continues, generated primarily by Iran's developing nuclear program and intensified by Iran's military assistance to Shiite armed groups in Iraq and to Lebanese Hezbollah. U.S. officials also accuse Iran of refusing to bring to justice several senior Al Qaeda activists in Iran. In part to direct regional attention to that view but also to engage Iran on an Iraq solution, the Administration attended regional conferences on Iraq on March 10, 2007, and May 3-4, 2007, both attended by Iran (and Syria), and subsequently held a bilateral meeting with Iran in Baghdad on May 28. The Bush Administration is pursuing several avenues to attempt to contain the potential threat posed by Iran, but the U.S. focus is now on multilateral sanctions and diplomatic pressure on Iran. Iran has not complied with repeated U.N. Security Council deadlines since August 2006 to cease uranium enrichment. That demand is encapsulated in two U.N. resolutions (1737 and 1747) to date that ban trade with and freeze the assets of Iran's nuclear and related entities and personalities, prevent Iran from transferring arms outside Iran, and require reporting on international travel by named Iranians. The economic pressure has included trying to persuade European governments to curb trade, investment, and credits to Iran; and pressuring foreign banks not to do business with Iran. To strengthen its diplomacy, the Administration has added components to efforts to contain Iran, including a naval buildup in the Persian Gulf, arrests of Iranian agents in Iraq. The Administration strongly denies it is planning on military action against Iran, but has refused to rule it out.
The Bush Administration has pursued several avenues to attempt to contain or end the potential threat posed by Iran, at times pursuing limited engagement directly or through allies, and at other times leaning toward pursuing efforts to change Iran's regime. Over the past two years, the Administration has focused primarily on blunting Iran's nuclear program by backing diplomatic efforts by European nations and Russia to negotiate permanent curbs on it. International concerns on nuclear issues and other strategic issues have been heightened by the accession of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, a hardliner, as president. He advocates a return to many of the original principles of the Islamic revolution as set down by the late Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini. Some advocate military action against Iran s nuclear infrastructure, but others believe that continued diplomacy, combined with offers of economic rewards or threats of international sanctions, is the only viable option. Still others believe that only an outright replacement of Iran s regime would diminish the threat posed by Iran to U.S. interests. U.S. sanctions currently in effect ban or strictly limit U.S. trade, aid, and investment in Iran and penalize foreign firms that invest in Iran s energy sector, but unilateral U.S. sanctions do not appear to have materially slowed Iran's WMD programs or shaken the regime's grip on power.
The Bush Administration has pursued several avenues to attempt to contain or end the potential threat posed by Iran, at times pursuing limited engagement directly or through allies, and at other times leaning toward pursuing efforts to change Iran's regime. Some believe a potential international crisis is looming over Iran's nuclear program because a U.S.-supported effort by three European nations to prevent an Iranian nuclear breakout is faltering. International concerns on nuclear issues have been heightened by the victory of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, an admitted hardliner, in Iran's presidential election on June 24, 2005. Some advocate military action against Iran's nuclear infrastructure, but others believe that continued diplomacy, combined with offers of economic rewards or threats of punishment, is the only viable option. Still others believe that only an outright replacement of Iran's regime would diminish the threat posed by Iran to U.S. interests. U.S. sanctions currently in effect ban or strictly limit U.S. trade, aid, and investment in Iran and penalize foreign firms that invest in Iran's energy sector, but unilateral U.S. sanctions do not appear to have materially slowed Iran's WMD programs or shaken the regime's grip on power. Other major U.S. concerns include Iran's policy in the Near East region, particularly Iran's material support to groups that use violence against the U.S.-led Middle East peace process, including Hizballah in Lebanon and the Palestinian groups Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad. Some senior Al Qaeda activists are in Iran as well, although Iran claims they are "in custody" and will be tried. Iran did not obstruct the U.S. effort to oust Iraq's Saddam Hussein, a longtime Tehran adversary, at least partly in the expectation that pro-Iranian Shiite Islamic factions would come to power in Iraq in the aftermath. That has largely occurred as a product of January 30, 2005 elections there.
According to the Administration's "National Security Strategy" document released on March 16, 2006, the United States "may face no greater challenge from a single country than Iran." That perception, generated first and foremost by Iran's developing nuclear program, intensified following the military confrontation between Iranian-armed and assisted Lebanese Hezbollah and Israel in July-August 2006. To date, the Bush Administration has pursued several avenues to attempt to contain the potential threat posed by Iran. However, the Administration's focus on preventing an Iranian nuclear weapons breakthrough has brought diplomatic strategy to the forefront of U.S. policy. The Bush Administration announced May 31 it would negotiate with Iran in concert with U.S. allies if Iran suspends uranium enrichment. However, Iran did not comply with an August 31, 2006, deadline to cease uranium enrichment, contained in U.N. Security Council Resolution 1696 (July 31, 2006). After almost four months of negotiations during which Russia and, to a lesser extent, China, argued that diplomacy with Iran would yield greater results than would sanctions, the Security Council agreed to impose some modest sanctions on trade with Iran's nuclear infrastructure and a freeze on trade with and the assets of related entities and personalities. (Resolution 1737, passed unanimously on December 23, 2006). If diplomacy and sanctions do not succeed, some advocate military action against Iran's nuclear infrastructure rather than acquiescence to a nuclear-armed Iran. Others in the Administration believe that only a change of Iran's regime would end the threat posed by Iran. Iran's nuclear program is not the only major U.S. concern on Iran. Successive administrations have pointed to the threat to the United States and its allies posed by Iran's policy in the Near East region, particularly material support to groups that use violence to prevent Israeli-Arab peace or undermine pro-U.S. governments. Such groups have long included Lebanese Hezbollah and the Palestinian groups Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad. Although there is no evidence of an operational relationship with Al Qaeda, some senior Al Qaeda activists are believed to be in Iran, although Iran claims they are "in custody." U.S. officials also accuse Iran of attempting to exert influence in Iraq by providing arms and other material assistance to Shiite Islamist militias, some of which are participating in escalating sectarian violence against Iraq's Sunnis there. Iran's human rights practices and strict limits on free expression have been consistently criticized by official U.S. and U.N. reports. Iran's purported repression of ethnic and religious minorities, particularly the Bahai'is, is said to be harsh. However, Iran holds elections for many senior positions, including that of president.
Iran : U.S. concerns and policy responses
According to the "National Security Strategy" document released on March 16, 2006, the United States "may face no greater challenge from a single country than Iran." That perception intensified following the military confrontation between Iranian-armed and assisted Lebanese Hezbollah and Israel in July-August 2006. To date, the Bush Administration has pursued several avenues to attempt to contain the potential threat posed by Iran, including supporting a long-term policy of changing Iran's regime. However, the Administration focus on preventing an Iranian nuclear weapons breakthrough has brought diplomatic strategy to the forefront of U.S. policy. As part of that effort, the Bush Administration announced May 31 it would negotiate with Iran in concert with U.S. allies if Iran suspends uranium enrichment; in past years the Bush Administration had only limited dialogue with Iran on specific regional issues. However, Iran did not comply with an August 31, 2006, deadline to cease uranium enrichment, contained in U.N. Security Council Resolution 1696 (July 31, 2006), dividing the United States and partner countries over whether to conduct renewed diplomacy with Iran or move quickly toward imposing international sanctions on it. If diplomacy and sanctions do not succeed, some advocate military action against Iran's nuclear infrastructure rather than acquiescence to a nuclear-armed Iran. Others in the Administration believe that only a change of Iran's regime would end the threat posed by Iran. Successive administrations have pointed to the threat posed by Iran's policy in the Near East region, particularly material support to groups that use violence to prevent or complicate Israeli-Arab peace. Such groups have long included Lebanese Hezbollah and the Palestinian groups Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad. U.S. officials also accuse Iran of attempting to exert influence in Iraq by providing arms and other material assistance to Shiite Islamist militias.
According to an Administration national security strategy document released on March 16, 2006, the United States may face no greater challenge from a single country than Iran. To date, the Bush Administration has pursued several avenues to attempt to contain the potential threat posed by Iran, including supporting a longterm policy of changing Iran's regime. However, the near-term Administration drive to prevent any Iranian nuclear weapons breakthrough has brought diplomatic and economic strategies to the forefront of U.S. policy. As part of that effort, the Bush Administration announced May 31 it would negotiate with Iran in concert with U.S. allies; in past years the Bush Administration had some limited dialogue with Iran on specific regional issues. If diplomacy and sanctions do not succeed, some advocate military action against Iran's nuclear infrastructure rather than acquiescence to a nuclear-armed Iran.
Addressing the perceived threat posed by Iran to a broad range of U.S. interests has been a top priority for the Obama Administration. A sense of potential crisis with Iran has taken hold since late 2011 as Iran's nuclear enrichment program continues to advance. That Iranian progress has caused the government of Israel to assert that it might take unilateral military action against Iran's nuclear facilities unless the United States provides assurances that it will act, militarily if necessary, to prevent Iran from developing a nuclear weapon. Aside from the nuclear issue, the United States has long seen a threat to U.S. interests posed by Iran's support for militant groups in the Middle East and in Iraq and Afghanistan. U.S. officials accuse Iran of helping Syria's leadership try to defeat a growing popular opposition movement and of taking advantage of Shiite majority unrest against the Sunni-led, pro-U.S. government of Bahrain. To counter the perceived threat from Iran, the Obama Administration has orchestrated broad international pressure on Iran through economic sanctions, while also offering Iran sustained engagement if it verifiably assures the international community that its nuclear program is peaceful. Since the beginning of 2012, as significant multilateral sanctions have been added on Iran's oil exports -- including an oil purchase embargo by the European Union that went into full effect on July 1, 2012 -- the regime has begun to acknowledge significant economic pressure. Iran's leaders returned to nuclear talks with six powers in April 2012 after a one year hiatus. Three rounds of talks held in April, in May, and in June yielded no breakthroughs, but did explore a potential compromise under which Iran might end uranium enrichment to 20% purity (a level not technically far from weapons grade) in exchange for substantial sanctions relief. Technical talks were held on July 3, 2012, with further conversations between Iranian and EU negotiators on July 24, and August 2, although still without a firm decision to hold another round of high level talks. The Administration expresses frustration that neither the pressure nor the diplomacy has, to date, altered Iran's pursuit of its nuclear program, but it asserts that there is time and space for these policies to succeed before contemplation of other options, such as U.S. military action.
The Bush Administration characterized Iran as a "profound threat to U.S. national security interests," a perception generated primarily by Iran's nuclear program and its military assistance to armed groups in Iraq and Afghanistan, to the Palestinian group Hamas, and to Lebanese Hezbollah. The Bush Administration's approach was to try to prevent a nuclear breakout by Iran by applying multilateral economic pressure on Iran while also offering it potential cooperation should it comply with the international demands to suspend its enrichment of uranium. The incorporation of diplomacy and engagement into the overall U.S. strategy led the Administration to approve the participation of a high-level State Department official at multilateral nuclear talks with Iran on July 19, 2008. To strengthen its approach, the Bush Administration maintained a substantial naval presence in the Persian Gulf, which U.S. commanders insist would prevent any Iranian attempts to close the crucial Strait of Hormuz for any extended period.
The Bush Administration has characterized Iran as a "profound threat to U.S. national security interests," a perception generated primarily by Iran's nuclear program and its military assistance to armed groups in Iraq and Afghanistan, to the Palestinian group Hamas, and to Lebanese Hezbollah. The Bush Administration's approach has been to try to prevent a nuclear breakout by Iran by applying coordinated international economic pressure on Iran while also offering it potential cooperation should it comply with the international demands to suspend its enrichment of uranium. The incorporation of diplomacy and engagement into the overall U.S. strategy led the Administration to approve the participation of a high-level State Department official at multilateral nuclear talks with Iran on July 19, 2008, although that meeting, and subsequent discussions, have not resulted in Iran's acceptance of the intemational offer of incentives. To strengthen its approach, the Bush Administration has maintained a substantial naval presence in the Persian Gulf, which U.S. commanders insist would prevent any Iranian attempts to close the crucial Strait of Hormuz for any extended period.
According to the Administration's "National Security Strategy" document released on March 16, 2006, the United States "may face no greater challenge from a single country than Iran." That Administration perception continues, generated primarily by Iran's nuclear program but intensified by Iran's military assistance to armed groups in Iraq and Afghanistan and to Hamas and Lebanese Hezbollah. However, the threat perception of other governments might change following the December 3, 2007 release of key judgements from a new National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) that indicates that Iran is likely not on a drive to develop an actual nuclear weapon. The Bush Administration argues that the NIE at least partly validates its approaches to containing the potential threat posed by Iran -- strengthening international economic and political isolation of Iran to compel it to comply with international demands that it curb its program. Still, the NIE does not claim that Iran has complied with U.N. Security Council demands that it cease uranium enrichment. Two U.N. resolutions (1737 and 1747) ban weapons of mass destruction (WMD)-related trade with Iran, freeze the assets of Iran's nuclear and related entities and personalities, prevent Iran from transferring arms outside Iran, and require reporting on international travel by named Iranians. With Iran still refusing to comply on enrichment but apparently mostly cooperating with an August 2007 offer to reveal to the International Atomic Energy Agency additional information on its past nuclear program, further sanctions, possibly including on civilian trade or financing, have been under discussion at the U.N. Security Council. Separate U.S. efforts, showing some success, have included trying to persuade European governments to curb trade, investment, and credits to Iran; and pressuring foreign banks not to do business with Iran.
According to the Administration's "National Security Strategy" document released on March 16, 2006, the United States "may face no greater challenge from a single country than Iran." To date, the Bush Administration has pursued several avenues to attempt to contain the potential threat posed by Iran, including supporting a long-term policy of changing Iran's regime. However, the near-term Administration drive to prevent any Iranian nuclear weapons breakthrough has brought diplomatic and economic strategies to the forefront of U.S. policy. As part of that effort, the Bush Administration announced May 31 it would negotiate with Iran in concert with U.S. allies; in past years the Bush Administration had only limited dialogue with Iran on specific regional issues. If diplomacy and sanctions do not succeed, some advocate military action against Iran's nuclear infrastructure rather than acquiescence to a nuclear-armed Iran. Iran's nuclear program is not the only major U.S. concern on Iran. Successive administrations have pointed to the threat posed by Iran's policy in the Near East region, particularly material support to groups that use violence to prevent or complicate Israeli-Arab peace. Such groups include Hizballah in Lebanon and the Palestinian groups Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad. Hamas formed a Palestinian government following its victory in January 25, 2006, elections, but it is thus far holding fast to its rejection of Israel. U.S. officials also accuse Iran of attempting to exert influence in Iraq by providing arms and other material assistance to Shiite Islamist militias, some of which have fought U.S. and partner forces there. However, most Iranian-supported factions in Iraq are supportive of the U.S.-led political transition roadmap. Iran's human rights practices and strict limits on free expression have been consistently criticized by official U.S. and U.N. reports. Iran's purported repression of ethnic and religious minorities is said to be harsh.
President Obama has said his Administration shares the goals of the previous Administration on Iran, but the Obama Administration is formulating strategies and approaches to achieve those goals that differ from those of its predecessor. According to President Obama, the Administration intends to expand direct diplomatic engagement with Iran. This effort was put in practice with a message to the Iranian people by President Obama marking Persian New Year (Nowruz), March 21, 2009, and a statement on April 8, 2009 that the United States would regularly attend multilateral meetings with Iran on its nuclear program. The Administration also has deemphasized potential U.S. military action, although without ruling that out completely, and it is not emphasizing efforts to promote democracy in Iran. Yet, there is debate among experts over whether these shifts will yield clear results. The policy decisions come as Iran enters its run-up to June 12, 2009 presidential elections, in which some prominent reformists, including Mir Hossein Musavi, are candidates. This increases the possibility the election might produce a somewhat more moderate government in Iran. The Bush Administration characterized Iran as a "profound threat to U.S. national security interests," a perception generated primarily by Iran's nuclear program and its military assistance to armed groups in Iraq and Afghanistan, to the Palestinian group Hamas, and to Lebanese Hezbollah. The U.S. approach was to try to prevent a nuclear breakout by Iran by applying multilateral economic pressure on Iran while also offering it potential cooperation should it comply with the international demands to suspend its enrichment of uranium.
According to the Administration's "National Security Strategy" document released on March 16, 2006, the United States "may face no greater challenge from a single country than Iran." That perception might have intensified in the context of Iran ally Lebanese Hizballah's military challenge to Israel in July 2006. To date, the Bush Administration has pursued several avenues to attempt to contain the potential threat posed by Iran, including supporting a long-term policy of changing Iran's regime. However, the near-term Administration drive to prevent any Iranian nuclear weapons breakthrough has brought diplomatic and economic strategies to the forefront of U.S. policy. As part of that effort, the Bush Administration announced May 31 it would negotiate with Iran in concert with U.S. allies; in past years the Bush Administration had only limited dialogue with Iran on specific regional issues. If diplomacy and sanctions do not succeed, some advocate military action against Iran's nuclear infrastructure rather than acquiescence to a nuclear-armed Iran. Successive administrations have pointed to the threat posed by Iran's policy in the Near East region, particularly material support to groups that use violence to prevent or complicate Israeli-Arab peace. Such groups have long included Lebanese Hizballah and the Palestinian groups Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad. Hamas formed a Palestinian government following its victory in January 25, 2006, elections, but it is thus far holding fast to its rejection of Israel. U.S. officials also accuse Iran of attempting to exert influence in Iraq by providing arms and other material assistance to Shiite Islamist militias, some of which are fighting U.S. and partner forces there. Iran's human rights practices and strict limits on free expression have been consistently criticized by official U.S. and U.N. reports. Iran's purported repression of ethnic and religious minorities, particularly the Bahai'is, is said to be harsh.
The Obama Administration views Iran as a major threat to U.S. national security interests, a perception generated not only by Iran's nuclear program but also by its military assistance to armed groups in Iraq and Afghanistan, to the Palestinian group Hamas, and to Lebanese Hezbollah. Particularly in its first year, the Obama Administration altered the previous U.S. approach by offering Iran's leaders an alternative vision of closer integration with and acceptance by the West. To try to convince Iranian leaders of peaceful U.S. intent, the Obama Administration downplayed discussion of potential U.S. military action against Iranian nuclear facilities and repeatedly insisted that it did not seek to change Iran's regime. It held to this position even at the height of the protests by the domestic opposition "Green movement" that emerged following Iran's June 12, 2009, presidential election.
The Bush Administration has pursued several avenues to attempt to contain or end the potential threat posed by Iran, at times pursuing limited engagement, and at other times leaning toward pursuing efforts to change Iran's regime. Some experts believe a potential crisis is looming over Iran's nuclear program because the Bush Administration is skeptical that efforts by several European allies to prevent a nuclear breakout by Iran will succeed. Some advocate military action against Iran's nuclear infrastructure, but others believe that a combination of diplomatic and economic rewards and punishment are the only viable options on the nuclear issue. U.S. sanctions currently in effect ban or strictly limit U.S. trade, aid, and investment in Iran and penalize foreign firms that invest in Iran's energy sector, but unilateral U.S. sanctions do not appear to have materially slowed Iran's Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) programs to date. Other major U.S. concerns include Iran's material support to groups that use violence against the U.S.-led Middle East peace process, including Hizballah in Lebanon and the Palestinian groups Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad. Some senior Al Qaeda activists are in Iran as well, and the 9/11 Commission has found that some officials in Iran might have facilitated or at least tolerated travel through Iran by Al Qaeda operatives. Iran did not obstruct the U.S. effort to oust Iraq's Saddam Hussein, a long-time Tehran adversary, at least partly in the expectation that pro-Iranian Shiite Islamic factions would come to power in Iraq in the aftermath. Iran is also reported to be cultivating and assisting pro-Iranian local leaders in Afghanistan. Iran's human rights practices and strict limits on democracy have been consistently and harshly criticized by official U.S. reports, particularly for Iran's suppression of religious and ethnic minorities.
According to the "National Security Strategy" document released on March 16, 2006, the United States "may face no greater challenge from a single country than Iran." That perception intensified following the military confrontation between Iranian-armed and assisted Lebanese Hezbollah and Israel in July-August 2006. To date, the Bush Administration has pursued several avenues to attempt to contain the potential threat posed by Iran. However, the Administration focus on preventing an Iranian nuclear weapons breakthrough has brought diplomatic strategy to the forefront of U.S. policy. As part of that effort, the Bush Administration announced May 31 it would negotiate with Iran in concert with U.S. allies if Iran suspends uranium enrichment; in past years the Bush Administration had only limited dialogue with Iran on specific regional issues. However, Iran did not comply with an August 31, 2006, deadline to cease uranium enrichment, contained in U.N. Security Council Resolution 1696 (July 31, 2006), dividing the United States and partner countries over whether to continue diplomacy with Iran or move to impose international sanctions on it. If diplomacy and sanctions do not succeed, some advocate military action against Iran's nuclear infrastructure rather than acquiescence to a nuclear-armed Iran. Others in the Administration believe that only a change of Iran's regime would end the threat Iran poses. Successive administrations have pointed to the threat to the United States and its allies posed by Iran's policy in the Near East region, particularly material support to groups that use violence to prevent Israeli-Arab peace. Such groups have long included Lebanese Hezbollah and the Palestinian groups Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad. U.S. officials also accuse Iran of attempting to exert influence in Iraq by providing arms and other material assistance to Shiite Islamist militias, some of which are participating in escalating sectarian violence against Sunnis there.
According to the Administration's National Security Strategy document released on March 16, 2006, the United States "may face no greater challenge from a single country than Iran." That perception continues, generated primarily by Iran's nuclear program and intensified by Iran's military assistance to armed groups in Iraq and Afghanistan and to Lebanese Hezbollah. In part to direct regional attention to that view but also to engage Iran on an Iraq solution, the Administration attended regional conferences on Iraq on March 10, 2007, and May 3-4, 2007, both attended by Iran (and Syria), and subsequently held bilateral meetings with Iran in Baghdad on May 28 and July 24, agreeing in the latter meeting to form a working group on Iraq security issues, which met for the first time on August 6. The Bush Administration is pursuing several approaches to attempt to contain the potential threat posed by Iran, but the U.S. emphasis is now on multilateral economic sanctions on Iran. Iran has not complied with repeated U.N. Security Council deadlines since August 2006 to cease uranium enrichment. That demand is encapsulated in two U.N. resolutions (1737 and 1747) that ban trade with and freeze the assets of Iran's nuclear and related entities and personalities, prevent Iran from transferring arms outside Iran, and require reporting on international travel by named Iranians. To strengthen its diplomacy, the Administration has added components to efforts to contain Iran, including a consistent large naval presence in the Persian Gulf; arrests of Iranian agents in Iraq. The Administration strongly denies it is planning on military action against Iran, but has refused to rule it out. Some legislation introduced in the 110th Congress, including H.R. 1400, S. 970, and H.R. 2880, would increase U.S. sanctions on Iran.
The Bush Administration characterizes Iran as a profound threat to U.S. national security interests, a perception generated primarily by Iran's nuclear program but that also takes into account Iran s military assistance to armed groups in Iraq, to the Palestinian group Hamas, and to Lebanese Hezbollah. The threat assessment of some other governments was lessened by the December 3, 2007 key judgements of a National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) that indicates that Iran is not driving to develop an actual nuclear weapon, but Administration officials say that this finding was not the main thrust of the NIE, which judged Iran to be continuing uranium enrichment. The Bush Administration approach to contain the potential threat posed by Iran s nuclear program is to strengthen international economic pressure on Iran while also offering Iran potential cooperation should it comply with the international demands to suspend its enrichment of uranium. This led the Administration to approve the participation of a high-level State Department official at multilateral nuclear talks with Iran on July 19, 2008, although that meeting, and subsequent discussions, have not resulted in Iran s acceptance of the international offer of incentives. A new U.N. Security Council resolution is being considered, although without publicly evident result as of September 2008, possibly because of U.S.- Russia tensions over Georgia. A previous three U.N. resolutions (1737, 1747, and 1803) impose sanctions that ban weapons of mass destruction (WMD)-related trade with Iran; freeze the assets of Iran s nuclear and related entities and personalities; prevent Iran from transferring arms outside Iran; ban or require reporting on international travel by named Iranians; call for inspections of some Iranian sea and airborne cargo shipments; and call for restrictions on dealings with some Iranian banks.
The Bush Administration has pursued several avenues to attempt to contain or end the potential threat posed by Iran, at times pursuing limited engagement, and at other times leaning toward pursuing efforts to change Iran's regime. Some experts believe a potential crisis is looming over Iran's nuclear program because the Bush Administration is skeptical that efforts by several European allies to prevent a nuclear breakout by Iran will succeed, although the Administration announced steps in March 2005 to support those talks. U.S. concerns have been heightened by the victory of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, an admitted hardliner, in Iran's presidential election on June 24, 2005. Some advocate military action against Iran's nuclear infrastructure, but others believe that a combination of diplomatic and economic rewards and punishment are the only viable options on the nuclear issue. U.S. sanctions currently in effect ban or strictly limit U.S. trade, aid, and investment in Iran and penalize foreign firms that invest in Iran's energy sector, but unilateral U.S. sanctions do not appear to have materially slowed Iran's WMD programs to date.
According to an Administration national security strategy document released on March 16, 2006, the United States "may face no greater challenge from a single country than Iran." To date, the Bush Administration has pursued several avenues to attempt to contain the potential threat posed by Iran, but support for a longer term policy of changing Iran's regime has apparently gained favor within the Administration as Iran has resisted permanent curbs on its nuclear program. In the nearer term, the Administration is intent on slowing or blunting Iran's nuclear program through diplomatic and economic pressure by the United Nations Security Council or a coalition of like-minded major countries. Because Iran continues to advance its nuclear program, some advocate military action against Iran's nuclear infrastructure. Others believe the United States should undertake direct talks with Iran; in past years the Bush Administration had some limited dialogue with Iran on specific regional issues. Iran's nuclear program is not the only major U.S. concern about Iran. Successive administrations have pointed to the threat posed by Iran's policy in the Near East region, particularly material support to groups that use violence against the U.S.-led Middle East peace process, including Hizballah in Lebanon and the Palestinian groups Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad. Hamas has formed a Palestinian government following its victory in January 25, 2006, elections, but it is thus far holding fast to its rejection of Israel. U.S. officials also accuse Iran of attempting to exert influence in Iraq by providing arms and other material assistance to Shiite Islamist militias, some of which have fought U.S. and partner forces there. Iran's human rights practices and strict limits on democracy have been consistently criticized by official U.S. and U.N. reports, particularly for Iran's suppression of political dissidents and religious and ethnic minorities.
According to the "National Security Strategy" of March 16, 2006, the United States "may face no greater challenge from a single country than Iran." That perception, generated primarily by Iran's developing nuclear program, has been intensified by Iran's assistance to Shiite armed groups in Iraq and to Lebanese Hezbollah. The Bush Administration is pursuing several avenues to attempt to contain the potential threat posed by Iran, but the Administration's focus on preventing an Iranian nuclear weapons breakthrough -- as well as on stabilizing Iraq -- has brought multilateral diplomatic strategy to the forefront. Since August 2006, Iran has not complied with repeated U.N. Security Council deadlines to cease uranium enrichment, resulting in two U.N. resolutions (1737 and 1747) to date that ban trade with and freeze the assets of Iran's nuclear and related entities and personalities, prevent Iran from transferring arms outside Iran, and require reporting on international travel by named Iranians. To strengthen its diplomacy, the Administration has added components to efforts to contain Iran, including a naval buildup in the Persian Gulf; arrests of Iranian agents in Iraq; efforts to persuade European governments to curb trade, investment, and credits to Iran; and pressure on foreign banks not to do business with Iran. Some legislation introduced in the 110th Congress, including H.R. 1400, S. 970, H.R. 957, and H.R. 1357, would tighten some U.S. sanctions on Iran. Amid signs that the pressure is causing increased strains among leaders in Iran, the Administration strongly denies it is planning on military action against Iran. Some in the Administration believe that only a change of Iran's regime would end the threat posed by Iran, although without a clear means of achieving such a result.
The Bush Administration characterizes Iran as a "profound threat to U.S. national security interests." The Administration perception is generated primarily by Iran's nuclear program but is increasingly focused on Iran's military assistance to armed groups in Iraq, which is resulting in U.S. battlefield losses. Iranian aid to the Palestinian group Hamas and Lebanese Hezbollah is also considered a key threat to U.S. interests. The threat assessment of some other governments was lessened by the December 3' 2007 key judgements of a National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) that indicates that Iran is likely not on a drive to develop an actual nuclear weapon, although Administration officials say that this finding was not the main thrust of the NIE, which judged Iran to be continuing uranium enrichment.
The Bush Administration has characterized Iran as a "profound threat to U.S. national security interests," a perception generated primarily by Iran's nuclear program and its military assistance to armed groups in Iraq and Afghanistan, to the Palestinian group Hamas, and to Lebanese Hezbollah. The Bush Administration's approach has been to try to prevent a nuclear breakout by Iran by applying coordinated international economic pressure on Iran while also offering it potential cooperation should it comply with the international demands to suspend its enrichment of uranium. The incorporation of diplomacy and engagement into the overall U.S. strategy led the Administration to approve the participation of a high-level State Department official at multilateral nuclear talks with Iran on July 19, 2008, although that meeting, and subsequent discussions, have not resulted in Iran's acceptance of the international offer of incentives. Based on statements during the campaign and since, the incoming Obama Administration is likely to focus more on consistent engagement with Iran and to de-emphasize the potential for U.S. military action or efforts to promote democracy in Iran. During 2006 and 2007, three U.N. Security Council resolutions (1737, 1747, and 1803) imposed sanctions that ban weapons of mass destruction (WMD)-related trade with Iran; freeze the assets of Iran's nuclear and related entities and personalities; prevent Iran from transferring arms outside Iran; ban or require reporting on international travel by named Iranians; call for inspections of some Iranian sea and airborne cargo shipments; and call for restrictions on dealings with some Iranian banks. Further U.N. Security Council sanctions have been considered, although progress was slowed by U.S.-Russia tensions over Georgia in August 2008.
President Obama has said his Administration shares the goals of the previous Administration to contain Iran's strategic capabilities and regional influence, but the Obama Administration has formulated approaches to achieve those goals that differ from those of its predecessor-in particular through expanded direct diplomatic engagement with Iran. This effort was put into practice with messages to the Iranian people by President Obama, and through invitations to and contact with Iranian diplomats at multilateral meetings, including those on Iran's nuclear program. The Administration also slowed or discontinued policies that Iranian eaders considered hostile including: ratcheting up international sanctions, efforts to promote democracy in Iran, and openly discussing the potential for U.S. military action. The Administration's Iran policy is in flux because of the Iranian crackdown against protesters who alleged vast fraud in the June 12, 2009 presidential election, in which incumbent President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad was declared the winner. The unrest represents the most serious challenge, to date, to the regime's authority, but virtually no observer predicts its imminent demise.
President Obama has said his Administration shares the goals of previous Administrations to contain Iran's strategic capabilities and regional influence. The Administration has not changed the previous Administration's characterization of Iran as a "profound threat to U.S. national security interests," a perception generated not only by Iran's nuclear program but also by its military assistance to armed groups in Iraq and Afghanistan, to the Palestinian group Hamas, and to Lebanese Hezbollah. The Obama Administration formulated approaches to achieve those goals that differ from those of its predecessor by expanding direct diplomatic engagement with Iran's government and by downplaying discussion of potential U.S. military action against Iranian nuclear facilities. However, the domestic unrest in Iran that has burgeoned since alleged fraud in Iran's June 12, 2009, presidential election has presented the Administration with a choice of whether to continue to engage Iran's government or to back the growing ranks of the Iranian opposition.
The Bush Administration characterizes Iran as a "profound threat to U.S. national security interests." The Administration perception is generated primarily by Iran's nuclear program but is increasingly focused on Iran's military assistance to armed groups in Iraq, which is resulting in U.S. battlefield losses. Iranian aid to the Palestinian group Hamas and Lebanese Hezbollah is also considered a key threat to U.S. interests. The threat assessment of some other governments was lessened by the December 3, 2007 key judgements of a National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) that indicates that Iran is likely not on a drive to develop an actual nuclear weapon, although Administration officials say that this finding was not the main thrust of the NIE, which judged Iran to be continuing uranium enrichment. To strengthen its diplomacy, the Administration has maintained a substantial naval presence in the Persian Gulf. The Administration has strongly denied widespread speculation that it plans military action against Iran, but has refused to rule it out if no other efforts to curb Iran's uranium enrichment program succeed. Some believe that the Administration might take military action to curb Iran's "malign" influence in Iraq. Others believe that only a change of Iran's regime would end the threat posed by Iran, although regime change is not currently a prominent feature of Administration policy toward Iran.
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Chemical, biological and radiological warfare.