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The U.S. Submarine Production Base. An Analysis of Cost, Schedule, and Risk for Selected Force Structures

In January 1993, RAND's National Defense Research Institute was asked by the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition to compare the practicality and cost of two approaches to future submarine production: (1) allowing production to shut down as currently programmed submarines are finished, then restarting it when more are needed, and (2) continuing low-rate production. The research was motivated by concerns that the submarine production base might not be easily reconstituted if production is shut down and by the countervailing recognition that deferring new submarine starts might yield substantial savings, particularly over the short term. This report is a summary of RAND's analysis, the results obtained, and the associated uncertainties. The reader should bear in mind, of course, that in a summary such as this, completeness and precision are in some degree sacrificed to brevity. A full treatment of methods and results appears in MR-456-OSD.

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  • "United States submarine production base"
  • "United States submarine production base"@en
  • "US submarine production base"
  • "US submarine production base"@en
  • "US submarine production base (executive summary)"

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  • "In January 1993, the RAND National Defense Research Institute was asked by the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition to compare the practicality and cost of two approaches to future submarine production: (1) allowing production to shut down as currently programmed submarines are finished, then restarting it when more are needed, and (2) continuing low-rate production."
  • "In January 1993, RAND's National Defense Research Institute was asked by the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition to compare the practicality and cost of two approaches to future submarine production: (1) allowing production to shut down as currently programmed submarines are finished, then restarting it when more are needed, and (2) continuing low-rate production. The research was motivated by concerns that the submarine production base might not be easily reconstituted if production is shut down and by the countervailing recognition that deferring new submarine starts might yield substantial savings, particularly over the short term. This report is a summary of RAND's analysis, the results obtained, and the associated uncertainties. The reader should bear in mind, of course, that in a summary such as this, completeness and precision are in some degree sacrificed to brevity. A full treatment of methods and results appears in MR-456-OSD."@en
  • "Our study thus had three purposes: To determine the practicality of extending the current gap between submarine starts, given the time required to restart production. We wanted to make sure we took into account the full potential advantages of deferring the length of the gap-the longer production is put off, the more money should be saved. So we sought to find the longest gap possible that still allowed meeting force objectives. To compare the cost of producing submarines after the longest gap practical with that of continuing production. This is equivalent to determining which is greater-the savings from postponing production or the offsetting costs of shutdown and restart-and by how much. To characterize the largely unquantifiable risks involved in a reconstitution strategy."@en
  • "In January 1993, RAND's National Defense Research Institute was asked by the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition to compare the practicality and cost of two approaches to future submarine production: (1) allowing production to shut down as currently programmed submarines are finished, then restarting it when more are needed, and (2) continuing low-rate production. The research was motivated by concerns that the submarine production base might not be easily reconstituted if production is shut down and by the countervailing recognition that deferring new submarine starts might yield substantial savings, particularly over the short term."@en
  • "In January 1993, RAND's National Defense Research Institute was asked by the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition to compare the practicality and cost of two approaches to future submarine production: (1) allowing production to shut down as currently programmed submarines are finished, then restarting it when more are needed, and (2) continuing low-rate production. The research was motivated by concerns that the submarine production base might not be easily reconstituted if production is shut down and by the countervailing recognition that deferring new submarine starts might yield substantial savings, particularly over the short term."

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  • "The U.S. Submarine Production Base. An Analysis of Cost, Schedule, and Risk for Selected Force Structures"@en
  • "The U.S. submarine production base an analysis of cost, schedule, and risk for selected force structures"@en
  • "The U.S. submarine production base an analysis of cost, schedule, and risk for selected force structures"
  • "The U.S. Submarine Production Base an Analysis of Cost, Schedule, and Risk for Selected Force Structures. Executive Summary"@en
  • "The US submarine Production Base : an analysis of cost, schedule, and risk for selected force structures"
  • "The U.S. submarine production base an analysis of cost, schedule, and risk for selected force structures : executive summary"@en
  • "The U.S. submarine production base : an analysis of cost, schedule, and risk for selected force structures"
  • "The US submarine production base : an analysis of cost, schedule, and risk for selected force structures Executive summary"
  • "The U.S. submarine production base : an analysis of cost, schedule, and risk for selected force structures : executive summary"

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