WorldCat Linked Data Explorer

Turtle N-Triple JSON-LD RDF/XML HTML Contact Us Home

http://worldcat.org/entity/work/id/503316695

The unity of consciousness

In chapter six I argue that the unity thesis also constrains our account of the self: if the unity thesis is true, then we need to think of the self in phenomenal terms.

Open All Close All

type

about

http://schema.org/about

contributor

creator

description

http://schema.org/description

  • "In chapter six I argue that the unity thesis also constrains our account of the self: if the unity thesis is true, then we need to think of the self in phenomenal terms."@en
  • "Chapters three and four are concerned with the second question: Is consciousness necessarily unified? In chapter three I tentatively endorse an inconceivability-based argument for thinking that they are not. Of course, a priori arguments against the possibility of disunified subjects must be weighed against empirical considerations. In chapter four I examine the evidence for thinking that some people actually are disunified subjects, focusing mostly on the split-brain syndrome. I argue that empirical arguments against the unity thesis are inconclusive. Chapters five and six are concerned with the third question: what implications does the unity of consciousness have? In chapter five I argue that the unity thesis places constraints on our account of state consciousness: if the unity thesis is true, then certain influential accounts of consciousness are false."@en
  • "Bayne examines the idea that a human being can have only a single stream of consciousness at any one point in time. He draws on philosophy, psychology, and neuroscience to defend the claim that consciousness is unified, and he explores the implications for theories of consciousness and for our understanding of the self."
  • "I am currently enjoying a number of experiences: I can hear the sound of a dog barking in the distance, I can feel the pressure of my feet on the floor, and I can smell freshly brewed coffee. These experiences don't simply occur at the same time, they also seem to be unified in a certain way. More generally, it is often said that consciousness is necessarily unified. This claim raises three questions: (1) What exactly does it mean? (2) Is it true? (3) What implications does it have?Chapters one and two are concerned with the first question: what does it mean to say that consciousness is unified? I develop a conception of the unity of consciousness that is both substantive and plausible. I call this conception the "unity thesis". Roughly, the unity thesis says that any pair of experiences that a single subject of experience has at the same time must be contained within a single fully unified phenomenal field: they must have a conjoint phenomenology."@en

genre

http://schema.org/genre

  • "Llibres electrònics"
  • "Electronic books"

name

http://schema.org/name

  • "The Unity of consciousness"
  • "The unity of consciousness"@en
  • "The unity of consciousness"
  • "The Unity of Consciousness"@en

workExample