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http://worldcat.org/entity/work/id/50460640

Inadequacy of Nation-Based and VaR-Based Safety Nets in the European Union

"Considered as a social contract, a financial safety net imposes duties and confers rights on different sectors of the economy. Within a nation, elements of incompleteness inherent in this contract generate principal-agent conflicts that are mitigated by formal agreements, norms, laws, and the principle of democratic accountability. Across nations, additional layers of incompleteness emerge that are hard to moderate. This paper shows that nationalistic biases and leeway in principles used to measure value-at-risk and bank capital make it unlikely that the crisis-prevention and crisis-resolution schemes incorporated in Basel II and EU Directives could allocate losses imbedded in troubled institutions efficiently or fairly across member nations"--National Bureau of Economic Research web site.

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  • "Considered as a social contract, a financial safety net imposes duties and confers rights on different sectors of the economy. Within a nation, elements of incompleteness inherent in this contract generate principal-agent conflicts that are mitigated by formal agreements, norms, laws, and the principle of democratic accountability. Across nations, additional layers of incompleteness emerge that are hard to moderate. This paper shows that nationalistic biases and leeway in principles used to measure value-at-risk and bank capital make it unlikely that the crisis-prevention and crisis-resolution schemes incorporated in Basel II and EU Directives could allocate losses imbedded in troubled institutions efficiently or fairly across member nations."
  • ""Considered as a social contract, a financial safety net imposes duties and confers rights on different sectors of the economy. Within a nation, elements of incompleteness inherent in this contract generate principal-agent conflicts that are mitigated by formal agreements, norms, laws, and the principle of democratic accountability. Across nations, additional layers of incompleteness emerge that are hard to moderate. This paper shows that nationalistic biases and leeway in principles used to measure value-at-risk and bank capital make it unlikely that the crisis-prevention and crisis-resolution schemes incorporated in Basel II and EU Directives could allocate losses imbedded in troubled institutions efficiently or fairly across member nations"--National Bureau of Economic Research web site."@en

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  • "Inadequacy of Nation-Based and VaR-Based Safety Nets in the European Union"@en
  • "Inadequacy of nation-based and VaR-based safety nets in the European Union"@en
  • "Inadequacy of Nation-Based and VaR-Based Safety Nets in the European Union"
  • "Inadequacy of nation-based and VaR-based safety nets in the European Union"
  • "Inadequacy of nation-based and var-based safety nets inthe european union"
  • "Inadequacy of nation-based and var-based safety nets in the European Union"

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