http://worldcat.org/entity/work/id/508184722

The German invasion of Yugoslavia : insights for crisis action planning and operational art in a combined environment

Monograph seeks to determine what implications for crisis action planning and operational art in combined environments can be derived from the German experience in the invasion of Yugoslavia (April 1941). This study has two collateral functions. First, from an historical standpoint, it highlights the state of German operational art between campaigns in France and Russia. Second, it provides a concise summary of the German invasion for military professionals currently exploring the history of warfare in Yugoslavia. On 27 March 1941, Adolf Hitler informed key political and military leaders of Nazi Germany that he had decided to invade Yugoslavia at the earliest possible moment. Prior to that meeting, the Wehrmacht was preparing for the invasions of Greece and Russia, and had no plans for an attack on Yugoslavia. However, by 5 April they had developed a campaign plan---OPERATION 25--and staged 21 divisions in Austria and three allied nations for the invasion. Furthermore, they coordinated their operation with four allied nations, two of whom join in the attack. OPERATION 25 began on 6 April and on the 18th Yugoslavia capitulated. Crisis action planning, The German invasion of Yugoslavia 1941, Operational art, Operation 25, Combined Operations, The balkans 1941.

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