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Congressional oversight manual

Interest in congressional oversight of intelligence has risen again in 2007, in part because of the House Democratic majority's pledge to enact the remaining recommendations from the U.S. National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, commonly known as the 9/11 Commission. Its conclusions in 2004 set the stage for reconsideration of the problems affecting Congress's structure in this area. The commission's unanimous report, covering a wide range of issues, concluded that congressional oversight of intelligence was dysfunctional and proposed two distinct solutions. These were, (1) creation of a joint committee on intelligence (JCI), modeled after the defunct Joint Committee on Atomic Energy (JCAE), with authority to report legislation to each chamber; or (2) enhanced status and power for the existing select committees on intelligence, by making them standing committees and granting both authorization and appropriations authority. Congress's interest in a joint committee on intelligence dates to 1948 and the early years of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and Director of Central Intelligence (DCI). Similar recommendations have arisen in the meantime, although the lion's share were made before separate intelligence committees were established in the House (1977) and Senate (1976). The numerous proposals for a joint committee on intelligence, which would end the two existing intelligence panels, moreover, vary significantly across a number of dimensions and raise competing viewpoints over practical matters and matters of principle.

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  • "CRS report for Congress"@en

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  • "Interest in congressional oversight of intelligence has risen again in 2007, in part because of the House Democratic majority's pledge to enact the remaining recommendations from the U.S. National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, commonly known as the 9/11 Commission. Its conclusions in 2004 set the stage for reconsideration of the problems affecting Congress's structure in this area. The commission's unanimous report, covering a wide range of issues, concluded that congressional oversight of intelligence was dysfunctional and proposed two distinct solutions. These were, (1) creation of a joint committee on intelligence (JCI), modeled after the defunct Joint Committee on Atomic Energy (JCAE), with authority to report legislation to each chamber; or (2) enhanced status and power for the existing select committees on intelligence, by making them standing committees and granting both authorization and appropriations authority. Congress's interest in a joint committee on intelligence dates to 1948 and the early years of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and Director of Central Intelligence (DCI). Similar recommendations have arisen in the meantime, although the lion's share were made before separate intelligence committees were established in the House (1977) and Senate (1976). The numerous proposals for a joint committee on intelligence, which would end the two existing intelligence panels, moreover, vary significantly across a number of dimensions and raise competing viewpoints over practical matters and matters of principle."@en
  • "Congressional oversight of policy implementation and administration has occurred throughout the history of the United States government under the Constitution. Oversight -- the review, monitoring, and supervision of operations and activities -- takes a variety of forms and utilizes various techniques. These range from specialized investigations by select committees to annual appropriations hearings, and from informal communications between Members or congressional staff and executive personnel to the use of extra congressional mechanisms, such as offices of inspector general and study commissions. Oversight, moreover, is supported by a variety of authorities -- the Constitution, public law, and chamber and committee rules -- and is an integral part of the system of checks and balances between the legislature and the executive."@en
  • "Interest in congressional oversight of intelligence has risen again in the 110th Congress, in part because of the House Democratic majority's pledge to enact the remaining recommendations from the U.S. National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, commonly known as the 9/11 Commission. Its 2004 conclusions set the stage for reconsideration of the problems affecting Congress's structure in this area. The commission's unanimous report, covering many issues, concluded that congressional oversight of intelligence was "dysfunctional" and proposed two distinct solutions. These were: (1) creation of a joint committee on intelligence (JCI), modeled after the defunct Joint Committee on Atomic Energy (JCAE), with authority to report legislation to each chamber; or (2) enhanced status and power for the existing select committees on intelligence, by making them standing committees and granting both authorization and appropriations power."@en
  • "The Congressional Oversight Manual was developed about 30 years ago following a three-day December 1978 Workshop on Congressional Oversight and Investigations. The workshop was organized by a group of House and Senate committee aides from both parties and the Congressional Research Service (CRS) at the request of the bipartisan House leadership. The Manual was produced by CRS with the assistance of a number of House committee staffers. In subsequent years, CRS sponsored and conducted various oversight seminars for House and Senate staff and updated the Manual as circumstances warranted. The last revision occurred in 2004. Worth noting is the bipartisan recommendation of the House members of the 1993 Joint Committee on the Organization of Congress (Rept. No. 103-413, Vol. I): [A]s a way to further enhance the oversight work of Congress, the Joint Committee would encourage the Congressional Research Service to conduct on a regular basis, as it has done in the past, oversight seminars for Members and congressional staff and to update on a regular basis its Congressional Oversight Manual."@en
  • "Interest in congressional oversight of intelligence has risen again in the 110th Congress, in part because of the House Democratic majority's pledge to enact the remaining recommendations from the U.S. National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, commonly known as the 9/11 Commission. Its 2004 conclusions set the stage for reconsideration of the problems affecting Congress's structure in this area. The commission's unanimous report, covering many issues, concluded that congressional oversight of intelligence was "dysfunctional" and proposed two distinct solutions. These were: (1) creation of a joint committee on intelligence (JCI), modeled after the defunct Joint Committee on Atomic Energy (JCAE), with authority to report legislation to each chamber; or (2) enhanced status and power for the existing select committees on intelligence, by making them standing committees and granting both authorization and appropriations power. Congress's interest in a joint committee on intelligence dates to 1948 and the early years of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and Director of Central Intelligence (DCI). Similar recommendations have arisen in the meantime, although the lion's share were made before separate Intelligence Committees were established in the House (1977) and Senate (1976). The numerous proposals for a JCI, which would end the two existing intelligence panels, moreover, vary in their specifics and raise competing viewpoints over practical matters and matters of principle."@en
  • "Interest in congressional oversight of intelligence has risen again in Congresses, in part because of disputes over reporting to Congress by intelligence community (IC) components on sensitive matters, including developments generated by the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. The changes in the oversight structure adopted or proposed in the 110th and 111th Congresses, however, reflect earlier concerns. This report first describes the Select Committees on Intelligence and then the former Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, often cited as a model for a counterpart on intelligence. The study also sets forth proposed characteristics for a joint committee on intelligence, differences among these, and their pros and cons. The report, to be updated as events dictate, examines other actions and alternatives affecting congressional oversight in the field."@en
  • "Interest in congressional oversight of intelligence has risen again in recent Congresses, in part because of disputes over reporting to Congress by intelligence community (IC) components on sensitive matters, including developments generated by the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. The changes in the oversight structure adopted or proposed in the 110th and 111th Congresses, however, reflect earlier concerns. For instance, the House Democratic majority had pledged in the 110th Congress to enact the remaining recommendations from the U.S. National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, commonly known as the 9/11 Commission. Its unanimous 2004 report set the stage for a reconsideration of congressional oversight, concluding that it was "dysfunctional." The commission proposed two distinct solutions: (1) creation of a joint committee on intelligence, modeled after the defunct Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, with authority to report legislation to each chamber; or (2) enhanced status and power for the existing select committees on intelligence, by making them standing committees and granting each one both authorization and appropriations power. A follow-up effort in 2010, headed by the co-chairs of the 9/11 Commission, observed that although "some progress has been made" in overseeing intelligence, the related field of homeland security reflected a "jurisdictional melee" among "fractured and overlapping jurisdictions ... [leading to] an unworkable system. "Another 2010 study-by the Commission on Weapons of Mass Destruction-concluded that Congress has been slow "to reform itself" and that "congressional oversight remains dysfunctional.""@en

genre

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  • "Handbooks and manuals"@en
  • "Handbooks and manuals"

name

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  • "Congressional oversight manual"@en
  • "Congressional oversight manual"
  • "Congressional oversight of intelligence : current structure and alternatives"@en
  • "Congressional oversight of intelligence current structure and alternatives"@en
  • "Congressional oversight of intelligence status and recommendations"@en
  • "Congressional Oversight of Intelligence: Current Structure and Alternatives"@en
  • "Congressional oversight"@en
  • "Congressional oversight of intelligence : status and recommendations"@en

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