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Willy Brandt and Ostpolitik

In the immediate post-war period, many in the West believed (correctly) that the Soviet empire was inherently unstable and expected (incorrectly) that Western technological superiority would quickly triumph over the Communist East. This view was shaken as the Soviet Union apparently caught up with and began to challenge the West in areas such as space. Emerging superpower status allowed Moscow to tighten control over its satellite states. Willy Brandt cites his first-hand observation of the 1961 building of the Berlin Wall as the act which ended his illusions over U.S. willingness to challenge unilateral Soviet acts in Moscow-dominated territory. By the late 1960s, the stage was set for detente (which required perceived near-equality to be operational). For detente to succeed, the West would have to accept an ideologically divided Europe for the foreseeable future. For the German nation, this meant a divided country, locked in separate spheres of influence and in two military alliances. In practical terms, it also made Germany the most likely future European battlefield, as NATO and Warsaw Pact troops faced each other across the inner German frontier.

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  • "In the immediate post-war period, many in the West believed (correctly) that the Soviet empire was inherently unstable and expected (incorrectly) that Western technological superiority would quickly triumph over the Communist East. This view was shaken as the Soviet Union apparently caught up with and began to challenge the West in areas such as space. Emerging superpower status allowed Moscow to tighten control over its satellite states. Willy Brandt cites his first-hand observation of the 1961 building of the Berlin Wall as the act which ended his illusions over U.S. willingness to challenge unilateral Soviet acts in Moscow-dominated territory. By the late 1960s, the stage was set for detente (which required perceived near-equality to be operational). For detente to succeed, the West would have to accept an ideologically divided Europe for the foreseeable future. For the German nation, this meant a divided country, locked in separate spheres of influence and in two military alliances. In practical terms, it also made Germany the most likely future European battlefield, as NATO and Warsaw Pact troops faced each other across the inner German frontier."@en
  • "The purpose of this paper is to analyze the grand strategy and statecraft of West German Chancellor Willy Brandt. More specifically, it is an analysis of Brandt's policy of Ostpolitik, which dominated the conduct of West German foreign affairs during Brandt's Chancellorship from 1969 to 1975. Broadly speaking, Ostpolitik is a term that has come to describe a policy that sought new openings to the East, a trend toward conciliation in Central Europe, and, above all for West Germany, a change in dealing with the issue of a divided Germany. More specifically, Brandt saw West Germany's interests as follows: (1) continued alliance with the West, (2) lessening of political tensions and confrontations in Central Europe, (3) economic expansion of trade with the East, and (4) reconciliation/reunification of the German people. The threats to these interests were many and came not only from foes, but friends alike. This essay attempts to answer the following question: how did the newly elected Social Democratic government of Willy Brandt arrive at this policy?"@en
  • "The government of the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG), led by Chancellor Willy Brandt, embarked in 1969 upon a policy of Ostpolitik: improved relations with the German Democratic Republic (GDR) and the Soviet Union. Brandt held two ministerial-level consultations with representatives of the GDR in the spring of 1970. Following subsequent negotiations at lower levels, several bilateral agreements -- signed in 1971 and 1972 -- increased the volume of cultural and economic traffic across the Inter-German Border and formalized mutual recognition of each state's political legitimacy. Ostpolitik also contributed to the conclusion of the 1971 Quadripartite Agreement, which clarified the political and economic links between West Berlin and the Federal Republic. By Brandt's own account, his policy was only partially successful, as much as he underestimated the resistance his initiatives would face. Yet, others often recall Ostpolitik as the successful catalyst that ushered in the decade of superpower detente. Following in the footsteps of Brandt's policy, the United States and the Soviet Union reached numerous agreements during the 1970s that stabilized, if not reduced, the intensity of the deadlocked ideological and military confrontation between East and West. Today, with that confrontation ail but moot, one might question whether Ostpolitik was a landmark foreign policy with broad general implications, or instead, simply an historical artifact of the Cold War. After reviewing the ends Brandt sought and the means he chose to accomplish them, this paper argues that Brandt's Ostpolitik contains relevant "lessons" for contemporary American policy makers, and that his policy is one of long-standing significance."@en

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  • "Willy Brandt and Ostpolitik"@en

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