Linked Data Explorerhttp://worldcat.org/entity/work/id/63250596
Self-protection and insurance with interdependencies
"We study optimal investment in self-protection of insured individuals when they face interdependencies in the form of potential contamination from others. If individuals cannot coordinate their actions, then the positive externality of investing in self-protection implies that, in equilibrium, individuals underinvest in self-protection. Limiting insurance coverage through deductibles can partially internalize this externality and thereby improve individual and social welfare"--National Bureau of Economic Research web site.
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http://schema.org/about
- http://experiment.worldcat.org/entity/work/data/63250596#Topic/versicherungsokonomik_versicherungsschaden_haftung_entscheidung_bei_risiko_konsuminterdependenz_spieltheorie
- http://experiment.worldcat.org/entity/work/data/63250596#Topic/arbeitspapier_working_paper
- http://experiment.worldcat.org/entity/work/data/63250596#Topic/online_publikation_online_publication
- http://id.loc.gov/authorities/subjects/sh87001042
- http://experiment.worldcat.org/entity/work/data/63250596#Topic/zonder_onderwerpscode_economie
- http://experiment.worldcat.org/entity/work/data/63250596#Topic/spieltheorie
- http://experiment.worldcat.org/entity/work/data/63250596#Topic/entscheidung_bei_risiko
- http://experiment.worldcat.org/entity/work/data/63250596#Topic/versicherungsokonomik
- http://experiment.worldcat.org/entity/work/data/63250596#Topic/versicherungsschaden
- http://experiment.worldcat.org/entity/work/data/63250596#Topic/konsuminterdependenz
- http://experiment.worldcat.org/entity/work/data/63250596#Topic/als_aufsatz_endgultig_erschienen_also_available_as_published_article
- http://id.worldcat.org/fast/974554
- http://experiment.worldcat.org/entity/work/data/63250596#Topic/haftung
- http://id.loc.gov/authorities/subjects/sh85066802
http://schema.org/description
- ""We study optimal investment in self-protection of insured individuals when they face interdependencies in the form of potential contamination from others. If individuals cannot coordinate their actions, then the positive externality of investing in self-protection implies that, in equilibrium, individuals underinvest in self-protection. Limiting insurance coverage through deductibles can partially internalize this externality and thereby improve individual and social welfare"--National Bureau of Economic Research web site."@en
- "We study optimal investment in self-protection of insured individuals when they face interdependencies in the form of potential contamination from others. If individuals cannot coordinate their actions, then the positive externality of investing in self-protection implies that, in equilibrium, individuals underinvest in self-protection. Limiting insurance coverage through deductibles can partially internalize this externality and thereby improve individual and social welfare."
http://schema.org/workExample
- http://www.worldcat.org/oclc/874816996
- http://www.worldcat.org/oclc/901204164
- http://www.worldcat.org/oclc/77706925
- http://www.worldcat.org/oclc/255765086
- http://www.worldcat.org/oclc/885154274
- http://www.worldcat.org/oclc/819138737
- http://www.worldcat.org/oclc/756561022
- http://www.worldcat.org/oclc/78924359