http://worldcat.org/entity/work/id/7598512

Natural openness and good government

August 2000 A naturally more open economy-as determined by its size and geography-devotes more resources to building good institutions and displays less corruption. Wei offers a possibly new interpretation of the connection between openness and good governance, with a conceptual model and some empirical evidence. Assuming that corruption and bad governance reduce international trade and investment more than domestic trade and investment, a naturally more open economy-as determined by its size and geography-would devote more resources to building good institutions and would display less corruption in equilibrium. How is natural openness defined? By size, geography, and language. France would be more naturally open than Argentina because Argentina is more remote. Ability to speak English facilitates international trade. A country with a long coast tends to be more open than a landlocked country. In the data, naturally more open economies do show less corruption even after their level of development is taken into account. Residual openness-which could include trade policies-is not important once natural openness is accounted for. Moreover, naturally more open economies also tend to pay civil servants salaries that are more competitive with those of their private sector counterparts. One implication of this research is that globalization may affect governance: as globalization deepens, the natural openness of all countries increases. This raises the opportunity cost of tolerating a given level of corruption and could provide new impetus for countries to fight corruption. These patterns are consistent with the conceptual model. This paper-a product of Public Economics, Development Research Group-is part of a larger effort in the group to study the determinants of corruption and governance. The author may be contacted at [email protected].

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