. . "Petroleum Prospecting." . . "Petroleum Prospecting" . "World Bank" . . "Exploration pétrolière." . . . . . . . . . . . "Electronic books" . "Electronic books"@en . . . . . "Governments often pursue a variety of economic, social and political objectives through their allocation policies that go beyond the maximization of the net present value of the economic rent. The optimal allocation policy depends on a range of country specific and exogenous factors. Despite the variety of factors influencing optimal design, most countries use similar solutions. In particular, when auctions or administrative procedures are used, most governments opt for simple simultaneous multi-object sealed-bid rounds. While this may appear to be paradoxical, there is a practical explanation."@en . . . . . . . . . . "Livres électroniques" . "Petroleum exploration and production rights allocation strategies and design issues" . "Petroleum exploration and production rights allocation strategies and design issues"@en . . "Petroleum Exploration and Production Rights Allocation Strategies and Design Issues" . "Petroleum Exploration and Production Rights Allocation Strategies and Design Issues"@en . . . . . . . . . . . . "\"This paper analyzes the available evidence on the advantages and disadvantages of various systems used by petroleum-producing countries to allocate petroleum exploration, development, and production rights, and considers the policy implications of each system. The experience of six petroluem-producing counties is presented in detail and numerous other examples are provided to derive lessons of wider applicability. The paper presents various conditions for policy makers about the optimal design of allocation systems.\"--Jacket."@en . . . . . "Electronic resource" . . "Étude comparée (Descripteur de forme)" . . . . . "Governments often pursue a variety of economic, social and political objectives through their allocation policies that go beyond the maximization of the net present value of the economic rent. The optimal allocation policy depends on a range of country specific and exogenous factors. Despite the variety of factors influencing optimal design, most countries use similar solutions. In particular, when auctions or administrative procedures are used, most governments opt for simple simultaneous multi-object sealed-bid rounds. While this may appear to be paradoxical, there is a practical explanation. It is true that more complex bidding forms might increase rent capture at bidding. However, the potential marginal gain is often limited, owing to most E&P projects' high level of uncertainty and risk. In addition market mechanisms, such as joint bidding and secondary markets, and the fiscal regime are widely used in the petroleum sector to correct inefficiency at the time of allocation." . . . . . . . . . . . . . "Petroleum exploration and production rights : allocation strategies and design issues" . . "Wereldbank." . . "Allokation" . . "Petroleum industry" . . "Exploration" . . "Pétrole Industrie et commerce." . . "Silvana, Tordo" . . "Business." . . "Pétrole Prospection." . . "Erdölkonzession" . . "Relatie energie-economie." . . "Petroleum industry and trade." . . "Petroleum industry and trade" . "Economics" . . "Erdölförderung" . . "Petroleum exploration" . . "BUSINESS & ECONOMICS Industries General." . . "Industrie pétrolière." . . "Electronic books." . . "Accord de licence." . . "Politique gouvernementale." . .