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The vost is cast : the effect of corporate governance on shareholder value

This paper estimates the effect of corporate governance provisions on shareholder value and long-term outcomes in S & P1500 firms. We apply a regression discontinuity design to shareholder votes on governance proposals in annual meetings. A close-call vote around the majority threshold is akin to a random outcome, allowing us to deal with prior expectations and the endogeneity of internal governance rules. Passing a corporate governance provision generates a 1.3% abnormal return on the day of the vote with an implied market value per provision of 2.8%. We also find evidence of changes in investment behavior and long-term performance improvements.

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  • "This paper estimates the effect of corporate governance provisions on shareholder value and long-term outcomes in S&P1500 firms. We apply a regression discontinuity design to shareholder votes on governance proposals in annual meetings. A close-call vote around the majority threshold is akin to a random outcome, allowing us to deal with prior expectations and the endogeneity of internal governance rules. Passing a corporate governance provision generates a 1.3% abnormal return on the day of the vote with an implied market value per provision of 2.8%. We also find evidence of changes in investment behavior and long-term performance improvements."
  • "This paper estimates the effect of corporate governance provisions on shareholder value and long-term outcomes in S & P1500 firms. We apply a regression discontinuity design to shareholder votes on governance proposals in annual meetings. A close-call vote around the majority threshold is akin to a random outcome, allowing us to deal with prior expectations and the endogeneity of internal governance rules. Passing a corporate governance provision generates a 1.3% abnormal return on the day of the vote with an implied market value per provision of 2.8%. We also find evidence of changes in investment behavior and long-term performance improvements."
  • "This paper estimates the effect of corporate governance provisions on shareholder value and long-term outcomes in S & P1500 firms. We apply a regression discontinuity design to shareholder votes on governance proposals in annual meetings. A close-call vote around the majority threshold is akin to a random outcome, allowing us to deal with prior expectations and the endogeneity of internal governance rules. Passing a corporate governance provision generates a 1.3% abnormal return on the day of the vote with an implied market value per provision of 2.8%. We also find evidence of changes in investment behavior and long-term performance improvements."@en

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  • "The Vote is Cast : the Effect of Corporate Governance on Shareholder Value"
  • "The vost is cast : the effect of corporate governance on shareholder value"@en
  • "The Vote is Cast the Effect of Corporate Governance on Shareholder Value"@en
  • "The vote is cast : the effect of corporate governance on shareholder value"
  • "The Vote is Cast : The Effect of Corporate Governance on Shareholder Value"
  • "The vote is cast the effect of corporate governance on shareholder value"@en
  • "The Vote is Cast The Effect of Corporate Governance on Shareholder Value"

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