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http://worldcat.org/entity/work/id/890568806

Apocalypse management Eisenhower and the discourse of national insecurity

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  • "For eight years President Dwight Eisenhower claimed to pursue peace and national security. Yet his policies entrenched the United States in a seemingly permanent cold war, a spiraling nuclear arms race, and a deepening state of national insecurity. Ira Chernus uncovers the key to this paradox in Eisenhower's unwavering commitment to a consistent way of talking, in private as well as in public, about the cold war rivalry. Contrary to what most historians have concluded, Eisenhower never aimed at any genuine rapprochement with the Soviet Union. He discourse always assumed that the United States would forever face an enemy bent on destroying it, making national insecurity a permanent way of life. The "peace" he sought was only an endless process of managing apocalyptic threats, a permanent state of "apocalypse management," intended to give the United States unchallenged advantage in every arena of the cold war. The goal and the discourse that supported it were inherently self-defeating. Yet the discourse is Eisenhower's most enduring legacy, for it has shaped U.S. foreign policy ever since, leaving us still a national insecurity state."
  • "Durante ocho años el Presidente Dwight Eisenhower afirmó su propósito de buscar la paz y la seguridad nacional. Sin embargo, sus políticas arraigadas de los Estados Unidos aparentemente en una permanente guerra fría, una espiral de la carrera de armamentos nucleares, y la profundización de un estado de inseguridad nacional. En este libro, el autor descubre la clave de esta paradoja Eisenhower en su inquebrantable compromiso con una manera de hablar, tanto en privado como en público, acerca de la guerra fría. Contrariamente a lo que la mayoría de los historiadores han concluido, Eisenhower nunca se encaminó a un verdadero acercamiento con la Unión Soviética. El discurso siempre partió del supuesto de que los Estados Unidos siempre se enfrentan a un enemigo empeñado en destruirlo. La "paz", que se trató sólo de un interminable proceso de gestión de amenazas apocalípticas, un estado permanente de "Apocalypse management", pretende dejar a los Estados Unidos sin ventaja en el escenario de l ..."

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  • "History"@en
  • "History"

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  • "Apocalypse management : Eisenhower and the discourse of national insecurity"
  • "Apocalypse management Eisenhower and the discourse of national insecurity"@en
  • "Apocalypse management Eisenhower and the discourse of national insecurity"

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