. . "Hochschule" . . "National Bureau of Economic Research." . . . "Lotteries in Student Assignment : an Equivalence Result" . . . . . . . . "Lotteries in Student Assignment: An Equivalence Result. Nber WorkingPaper No. 16140"@en . "This paper formally examines two competing methods of conducting a lottery in assigning students to schools, motivated by the design of the centralized high school student assignment system in New York City. The main result of the paper is that a single and multiple lottery mechanism are equivalent for the problem of allocating students to schools in which students have strict preferences and the schools are indifferent. In proving this result, a new approach is introduced, that simplifies and unifies all the known equivalence results in the house allocation literature. Along the way, two new mechanisms--Partitioned Random Priority and Partitioned Random Endowment--are introduced for the house allocation problem. These mechanisms generalize widely studied mechanisms for the house allocation problem and may be appropriate for the many-to-one setting such as the school choice problem."@en . . . . . "This paper formally examines two competing methods of conducting a lottery in assigning students to schools, motivated by the design of the centralized high school student assignment system in New York City. The main result of the paper is that a single and multiple lottery mechanism are equivalent for the problem of allocating students to schools in which students have strict preferences and the schools are indifferent. In proving this result, a new approach is introduced, that simplifies and unifies all the known equivalence results in the house allocation literature. Along the way, two new mechanisms - Partitioned Random Priority and Partitioned Random Endowment - are introduced for the house allocation problem. These mechanisms generalize widely studied mechanisms for the house allocation problem and may be appropriate for the many-to-one setting such as the school choice problem." . "Lotteries in Student Assignment An Equivalence Result" . "Lotteries in student assignment an equivalence result" . "Lotteries in student assignment an equivalence result"@en . . . . . . "Reports - Evaluative"@en . . . . "Lotteries in Student Assignment an Equivalence Result"@en . . "Lotteries in student assignment : an equivalence result"@en . . . . . . . . . "This paper formally examines two competing methods of conducting a lottery in assigning students to schools, motivated by the design of the centralized high school student assignment system in New York City. The main result of the paper is that a single and multiple lottery mechanism are equivalent for the problem of allocating students to schools in which students have strict preferences and the schools are indifferent. In proving this result, a new approach is introduced, that simplifies and unifies all the known equivalence results in the house allocation literature. Along the way, two new mechanisms -- Partitioned Random Priority and Partitioned Random Endowment -- are introduced for the house allocation problem. These mechanisms generalize widely studied mechanisms for the house allocation problem and may be appropriate for the many-to-one setting such as the school choice problem." . "This paper formally examines two competing methods of conducting a lottery in assigning students to schools, motivated by the design of the centralized high school student assignment system in New York City. The main result of the paper is that a single and multiple lottery mechanism are equivalent for the problem of allocating students to schools in which students have strict preferences and the schools are indifferent. In proving this result, a new approach is introduced, that simplifies and unifies all the known equivalence results in the house allocation literature. Along the way, two new mechanisms -- Partitioned Random Priority and Partitioned Random Endowment -- are introduced for the house allocation problem. These mechanisms generalize widely studied mechanisms for the house allocation problem and may be appropriate for the many-to-one setting such as the school choice problem."@en . "New York (NY)" . . "Bildungspolitik" . . "Allokation" . . "Electronic documents." . . "Schulauswahl" . . "USA" . .