Linked Data Explorer
Evaluation of selected features of U.S. nuclear nonproliferation law and policy report to the Congress
Recent changes in U.S. nuclear nonproliferation law and policy focus heavily on curbing the capability of nations to produce nuclear weapons. The 1978 Nuclear Nonproliferation Act attempts to provide a balance of controls and incentives directed toward discouraging other nations from developing fuel-cycle capabilities that would provide independent access to plutonium and highly enriched uranium, the two indispensable ingredients of nuclear weapons. With the emergence of foreign enrichment capabilities, U.S. reliance on its uranium enrichment capability as a nonproliferation tool has become an outdated idea. The United States is committed to being a reliable supplier of enrichment services to nations adhering to effective nonproliferation policies. Foreign concerns over U.S. reliability as a nuclear trading partner center around the delays and uncertainties associated with the nuclear export control system. There is substantial opposition to requirements of the nonproliferation law which would extend U.S. rights to approve foreign processing of U.S.-supplied nuclear fuel. U.S. reprocessing approval rights have been a factor in influencing countries not to purchase U.S. supplies and services. It is not apparent that the construction of a new enrichment plant is justified at this time. The Department of Energy (DOE) has not fully and objectively considered options that would allow it to meet demand and delay the current construction program until more is known about advanced enrichment technologies under development.
- "Recent changes in U.S. nuclear nonproliferation law and policy focus heavily on curbing the capability of nations to produce nuclear weapons. The 1978 Nuclear Nonproliferation Act attempts to provide a balance of controls and incentives directed toward discouraging other nations from developing fuel-cycle capabilities that would provide independent access to plutonium and highly enriched uranium, the two indispensable ingredients of nuclear weapons. With the emergence of foreign enrichment capabilities, U.S. reliance on its uranium enrichment capability as a nonproliferation tool has become an outdated idea. The United States is committed to being a reliable supplier of enrichment services to nations adhering to effective nonproliferation policies. Foreign concerns over U.S. reliability as a nuclear trading partner center around the delays and uncertainties associated with the nuclear export control system. There is substantial opposition to requirements of the nonproliferation law which would extend U.S. rights to approve foreign processing of U.S.-supplied nuclear fuel. U.S. reprocessing approval rights have been a factor in influencing countries not to purchase U.S. supplies and services. It is not apparent that the construction of a new enrichment plant is justified at this time. The Department of Energy (DOE) has not fully and objectively considered options that would allow it to meet demand and delay the current construction program until more is known about advanced enrichment technologies under development."@en
- "Evaluation of selected features of U.S. nuclear nonproliferation law and policy : report to the Congress"
- "Evaluation of selected features of U.S. nuclear nonproliferation law and policy report to the Congress"@en